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ABSTRACT 
First responders have struggled to incorporate strategic direction provided by the 
federal government into their existing plans. An urgent call for teamwork and cooperation 
has changed the landscape for America’s first responders. They have been required to 
shoulder new responsibilities and become more networked and interactive with their peer 
disciplines to achieve higher levels of performance and response capability. This thesis 
examines interactions among four key homeland security disciplines in the Seattle, 
Washington urban area. It evaluates how municipal fire service, law enforcement, 
emergency management, and public health organizations have used federal government 
guidance and programs to prepare for catastrophic terrorism response. 
Specifically, it describes how the homeland security roles, organizational cultures, 
and collaboration challenges currently facing local public safety agencies have impacted 
the urban area environment. Based on findings from local and national inquiries, it 
explains how the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National 
Planning Scenarios (NPS) have impacted interagency collaboration. This study provides 
a detailed description of the homeland security environment from the inside by 
identifying challenges facing first responders and the strengths and gaps in their 
relationships. Finally, it offers positive policy recommendations to Seattle area public 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The Federal Government has identified fire departments, law enforcement and 
emergency management agencies, and public health departments in major U.S. 
population centers as central components of the homeland security enterprise. These 
agencies represent key homeland security disciplines at the local level. Collectively, they 
are not yet prepared to respond to catastrophic terrorism using nationally prescribed 
plans, tools, and resources. The level of interagency, interdisciplinary, and 
intergovernmental cooperation necessary to meet the needed capability forecast by 
experts has not been attained. 
Several national reports have found that local first responders are less than fully 
prepared to respond to catastrophic terrorism incidents. Both the Hart-Rudman1 and 9/11 
Commission2 reports have described coordination problems between levels of 
government. The Gilmore Commission’s fifth report describes a future vision that the 
country has not yet attained in which state and local responders have been adequately 
funded, equipped, and trained to meet nationally defined and accepted terrorism 
preparedness standards.3 Retired United States Coast Guard Officer and terrorism expert 
Stephen Flynn stated that “America is dangerously unprepared to respond to another 
attack on American soil.”4 The RAND Corporation, Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), Congressional Research Service (CRS), and the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services have all issued reports that highlight the need for better coordination. 
The threat of additional terrorist attacks has resulted in the distribution by the 
Federal Government of financial resources, plans, and preparedness standards for first 
responders and support agencies. First responders are struggling to incorporate the 
 
1  Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, America Still Unprepared - America Still in Danger 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002), 9. 
2  The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 567. 
3  Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing Our Homeland, Preserving Our Liberty (Arlington, 
VA: RAND Corporation, 2003). 
4  Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2004), 1. 
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unified strategic direction being provided by the Federal Government into existing plans. 
A universal call for teamwork and increased cooperation has changed the landscape for 
America’s first responders, requiring them to shoulder new responsibilities and become 
more networked and interactive with other disciplines to achieve higher levels of 
performance and response capability. We must assume that our silent partner, the terrorist 
adversary, is also engaged in planning and preparation. 
An identified gap exists between desired response capabilities and current 
abilities. Regarding our ability to treat potential victims, nationally prescribed plans and 
goals have described necessary capabilities numbered in terms of treating tens of 
thousands while current capabilities are measured in the hundreds.5 First responders have 
varying levels of understanding about existing plans, and a lack of clarity about how 
those plans should be executed. The majority of existing plans have not been “stressed” 
or field tested.6 Often times, the benefits gained from exercising plans do not penetrate all 
organizational levels. 
The goal of this study was to generate a detailed description of current 
interagency challenges facing first responders and to identify the strengths and gaps in 
the relationships between key disciplines by examining their interactions. This study 
assessed the perspectives of key homeland security disciplines in Seattle, Washington. 
Seattle was identified by the Department of Homeland Security for special funding as one 
of the first seven Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) cities.7  
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
At the time of this writing, the National Preparedness System is under 
development within the DHS. It holds significant implications for the operations and 
priorities of homeland security officials, emergency managers, and first responders. The 
National Preparedness System documents and the procedures they contain will guide  
  
5  National Planning Scenarios (Washington, D.C.: Homeland Security Council, 2004). 
6  Bryan Hastings (Battalion Chief, Seattle Fire Department, USAR), in discussion with the author, 
March 2005. 
7  Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, Effective Regional Coordination can 
Enhance Emergency Preparedness, September, 2004 (GAO-04-1009), Washington, DC: GPO, 2004, 1. 
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federal funding allocation decisions, direct federal and non-federal efforts to build 
emergency response capabilities, and establish the means by which homeland security 
priorities will be set. 
Six basic documents comprise the National Preparedness System. These are the 
National Preparedness Goal (NPG) (in draft at the time of this writing), the National 
Planning Scenarios (NPS), the Universal Task List (UTL), the Target Capabilities List 
(TCL), the National Response Plan (NRP), and the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS).8 
This thesis addresses the following major question: At the ground level, how well 
is the National Preparedness System understood and how well are the components that 
require local interagency collaboration being implemented in practice? To answer this 
question, the thesis focuses on determining the homeland security interagency challenges, 
impeding collaboration and cooperation, which can be identified by examining the 
approaches and perspectives of key disciplines in the Seattle urban area. 
To determine these challenges, subsequent chapters address the following 
subsidiary questions: 
• How do public safety agencies from a variety of disciplines central to 
homeland security perceive their roles and responsibilities with regard to 
terrorist incident response? 
• How well do these various entities currently collaborate to increase 
readiness to respond together and achieve successful incident resolution? 
• How do these entities perceive the organization and effectiveness of their 
peer elements? 
• What processes are in place within each discipline to further develop and 
refine existing collaborative efforts? 
• How successfully will these entities use Federal Government resources such 
as the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident 
Command System (ICS) to increase performance in a team environment 
(such as unified command)? 
• How do these various entities rate the usefulness of the National Planning 
Scenarios (NPS)? 
 
8  Keith Bea, The National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 2005), 2. In addition, the (interim) National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP) should also be considered closely associated with the National Preparedness System. To view the 
NIPP, see www.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/CSD3754.pdf (accessed February 2006). 
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C. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Homeland security literature sources focused on interagency cooperation have 
increased since September 11, 2001. The literature can be divided into historical lessons 
and perspectives, interagency cooperation, preparedness, and roles and responsibilities. 
The 9/11 Committee, Hart-Rudman Commission, and Select Homeland Security 
Committee have attempted to determine which lessons, learned from past tragedies, can 
provide valuable insight for present and future incidents. The 9/11 attacks on New York 
have been examined extensively by McKinsey who determined that the Fire Department 
of New York (FDNY) did not have effective interagency arrangements in place.9 By 
comparison, the incident managers in Washington, D.C. relied on the use of the Incident 
Command System (ICS) and existing mutual aid agreements and realized benefits not 
apparent at the New York site. 
A noteworthy study was conducted on the space shuttle Columbia recovery 
operation. The case is instructive because the size and scope of the recovery operation is 
comparable to a potential terrorist incident, and because the timing roughly coincided 
with the formation of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Donahue asked, 
“What lessons about major incident management can be offered to the leaders of the new 
DHS regarding Incident Management Teams (IMT)?”10 A major finding of this report 
was that the ICS can be used to organize and unify multiple disciplines under one 
functional organization.11 
Another common central question is how cooperation and collaboration can be 
used effectively. The essence of the question being asked is how can meaningful 
cooperation that furthers homeland security goals be achieved? This question applies in 
three contexts: between local governments in a regional setting, between levels of 
government (local, state, and federal), and between disciplines. Disincentives to 
collaboration have been identified in all three contexts. 
 
9 McKinsey and Company, “Report for F.D.N.Y.,” [online reference], 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/mck_report/introduction.pdf, (accessed May 12, 2005) 
10  Amy K. Donahue, Incident Management Team All-Risk Operations and Management Study, United 
States Forest Service, Region 8, FEMA, August, 2003, 3. 
11  Ibid., 5. 
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A third important question is related to preparedness. The Office for Domestic 
Preparedness (ODP) has released several new plans, tools, and resources related to 
preparedness. These include the National Response Plan (NRP), NIMS, NPS, National 
Preparedness Goal, etc. Lipowicz has questioned whether or not these resources will 
serve their intended purposes.12 My personal observations lead me to conclude that these 
tools are not being embraced or utilized in their intended fashion in the Seattle area. 
Findings of this thesis help explain why these tools are deemed more or less valuable or 
useful by different homeland security disciplines. 
A fourth key question is related to roles and responsibilities. The United States 
Fire Administration (USFA) and the GAO have questioned whether or not different types 
of first responder agencies and levels of government have a clear understanding of the 
roles and responsibilities of their counterparts.13 Again, this question is best examined in 
the three contexts mentioned above. Are roles and responsibilities between levels of 
government, jurisdictions, and disciplines adequately understood, clarified, and reflected 
in plans? A clear delineation of role and responsibility assignment is critical to achieving 
successful incident outcomes. 
Research findings are divided into three distinct groups or “camps” for the general 
purpose of examining their intended messages. The first grouping is represented by the 
“alarmists.” The alarmists demonstrate the existence and importance of homeland 
security problems and vulnerabilities. The second grouping of sources represents “tools, 
plans, and resources,” and is largely composed of government documents, reports, and 
monographs. The third group advocates collaboration and cooperation as the primary 
method for solving homeland security problems. This group has offered that “purple 
approaches” are the key. The term “purple approach” is derived from military lexicon and 
indicates a blending of the colors of different military service uniforms.14 The military 
has had collaborative success by emphasizing service “jointness.” 
 
12  Alice Lipowicz, “Homeland Security Local Response,” Congressional Quarterly (November 2004), 
2. 
13  United States Fire Administration, Responding to Incidents of National Consequence – 
Recommendations for America’s Fire and Emergency Services Based on the Events of 9/11/2001, and 
Other Similar Incidents (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2004), 66. 
14  Melissa Czarnecki, Executive Education Seminar for Major Urban Areas (Policy Seminar), Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, January 8, 2005, seminar notes. 
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Perhaps the most alarming source referred to a senior level bioterrorism exercise 
called “dark winter.” The exercise simulated a covert smallpox attack on the U.S. 
O’Toole concluded that senior-level decision makers were largely unfamiliar with the 
sequence of events that would follow a bioterrorist attack, available policy options, and 
their consequences.15 National security and defense communities have not typically 
analyzed these issues in the past. Other recent studies that paint an alarmist portrait 
include “When Terrorism Hits Home:  How Prepared Are State and Local Law 
Enforcement?”16 “Are We Prepared for Terrorism Using Weapons of Mass Destruction? 
Government’s Half Measures,”17 and “Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership 
Will Be Critical to Success.”18 Findings from the “alarmist” group highlight the need for 
increased preparedness activity on the state and local level. 
The second group of sources is comprised of “tools and resources” offered to state 
and local homeland security agencies. Published mostly by the Federal Government, 
these sources offer solutions to apparent problems. The resources provide a roadmap for 
progress, based on goals, plans, and objectives. Examples of these resources include the 
NRP, NIMS, NPS, Target Capabilities List (TCL), and the National Preparedness Goal 
and Guidance.19 These sources are a direct response to Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive eight (HSPD 8) which requires the implementation of national preparedness 
standards and plans for first responders. 
The third group of sources offers “purple approaches” centered on cooperation, 
collaboration, and a need to re-examine traditional roles and responsibilities. Increased 
inter-agency and inter-jurisdictional cooperation are a necessary part of any lasting 
 
15  Tara O’Toole, “Shining Light on Dark Winter,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 34 (2002): 980. 
16  Lois M. Davis et al., When Terrorism Hits Home: How Prepared are State and Local Law 
Enforcement? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004). 
17  Eric R. Taylor, “Are We Prepared for Terrorism Using Weapons of Mass Destruction? 
Government’s Half Measures,” Policy Analysis 1, no. 387 (2000): 7. 
18  JayEtta Hecker, Director of Physical Infrastructure, Homeland Security - Intergovernmental 
Coordination and Partnership Will Be Critical to Success (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2002). 
19  The National Preparedness Goal and Guidance currently exist as draft documents. If they are 
finalized and distributed prior to the completion of this project, the author hopes to subject them to analysis 
in the third round of the Delphi process. 
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solution. Bruner (1992) detailed the positive collaborative effects of the welfare/family 
services field and how their solutions could be applied to other situations.20 
Regarding the groups of sources, there are several examples where authors have 
disagreed or drawn distinctly separate conclusions. The most prominent examples are the 
utility of the NIMS, the NPS, and the TCL and performance measures for first responders. 
The assumption that the NIMS and the ICS will be useful and productive for all agencies 
has been challenged. Public health, public works, and information technology agencies 
have been identified as potential first responders and are obligated to use NIMS. Their 
eligibility to receive federal funding is predicated on their adoption and use of the system. 
Eilbert has expressed doubt about the utility of the ICS system for these identified groups.21 
Public health agencies view the adoption of NIMS/ICS as reflecting a “different language 
and approach” to problem solving that does not necessarily enhance their existing efforts. 
Another related issue is whether or not ICS has limitations for certain types of public 
agencies limited by size, finances, or geographical characteristics. 
Both broad and specific homeland security questions remain unanswered. It is 
unclear what collective actions our nation should take to enhance safety while keeping 
attention focused on homeland security. We must determine how to increase the capacity 
of our emergency medical facilities to meet the “surge potential” forecast by the NPS. 
Public safety agencies should develop plans that will enhance their ability to manage 
incidents with victims numbering in the tens or hundreds of thousands, because their 
existing capacity is numbered in the hundreds. Public safety executives should foster 
meaningful interagency collaboration between homeland security disciplines and create 
mutual understanding and agreement on the roles and responsibilities of different 
agencies. The identified disincentives to collaboration – legal, geographical, cultural, and 
structural - need to be addressed. Timely and useful intelligence should be produced and 
shared with all first responders, not just law enforcement officers. 
Closer interagency coordination will be required to successfully manage future 
incidents of national significance. Effective interdisciplinary collaborative relationships 
 
20  C. Bruner, What Does Research Say About Interagency Collaboration? North Central Regional Educational 
Laboratory [online article] Oak Brook, Illinois, 1992 http://www.ncrel.org/sdrs/areas/stw_esys/8agcycol.htm , 
(accessed March 11, 2005), 6. 
21  Kay Eilbert, Examining Collaborative Public Health Practice and Emergency Preparedness – Can 
it Work? Turning Point Partnerships Share Their Experience, N.A.C.C.H.O., April, 2004, 7. 
8 
have not been incentivized and integrated in the Seattle urban area. Federal requirements 
for local interagency collaboration have been spelled out in HSPD 5 and 8 including 
NIMS, the ICS language it contains, and the concept of unified command. These tools 
have been recognized, but not formally adopted, accepted or internalized among all key 
disciplines. Government and political structures have not tangibly enhanced regional 
coordination. An existing lack of understanding about others’ roles and specific 
operational responsibilities will have negative effects on future incident outcomes if left 
uncorrected. These issues, drawn from the literature, have guided my research into the 
relationships among the key disciplines. 
 
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary aim of this research is to examine the relationships between fire, 
police, public health and emergency management organizations in the Seattle area. 
Specifically, I investigated the perceived quality, value, and necessity of the relationships 
of these key disciplines to determine current collaboration challenges, barriers, and 
successes. The central goal of this process was to identify where future efforts and 
resources should be concentrated. 
My specific intention was to question the experts representing each discipline 
about the usefulness of the elements of HSPD 5 and 8 including NIMS and the ICS to 
determine if they are the best management tools to achieve interdisciplinary cooperation 
and coordination for terrorism response. My original suspicion, that organizational 
culture plays a role in its poor acceptance, was validated by subject matter experts from 
various disciplines. I also wanted to examine the perceptions of each discipline with 
regard to roles and responsibilities. I have observed firsthand an existing lack of clarity 
about leadership and supportive role assignments. Gone uncorrected, this confusion could 
result in duplication of effort and poor performance at future incidents. My final goal, to 
produce positive policy recommendations that will increase the level of cooperation 
among the key disciplines, was challenging. Hopefully, the recommendations included in 
Chapter VI will be accepted by decision makers and result in increased collaborative 
preparedness activities that will strengthen terrorism-related response capabilities in the 
Seattle urban area. 
9 
E. METHOD 
This study used the Delphi Method which has been described by Linstone and 
Turoff (1975) as “a method for structuring a group communication process so that the 
process is effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex 
problem.” 22 Developed by the RAND Corporation in the late 1960s as a forecasting 
methodology, the technique is used today to elicit expert opinion in a systematic manner 
for useful results. The tool works informally, with a small number of respondents, and 
reaps the benefits of group decision making while insulating the process from overly-
dominant group members and political lobbying. The process allows anonymity for 
respondents, who receive measured feedback from the controller. The controller modifies 
the scope and content of questions with successive rounds of questioning, working 
towards consensus and identifying areas of disagreement. As Delphi controller, I 
explored public safety executives’ perceptions of interagency collaboration and certain 
elements of the National Preparedness System through personal interviews and an 
iterative process of short, electronic surveys. From the research process, I derived 
recommendations on how to improve preparedness for terrorism response in the Seattle 
area. The research process was: 
Phase 1: 
Review of the literature and lessons learned on the “models” available or in use in 
“collaboration” for Homeland Security. Many of these models were extracted from 
Federal Government documents such as the NIMS, NRP, National Strategies, and 
monographs from commissions. Others are inferred from texts and articles. 
Phase 2: 
Following classic strategic planning, the questions addressed what, how, and who. 
The goal was to describe what disciplines at what levels are involved in preparedness 
collaboration and what obstacles they face. I also sought to identify what elements, 
                                                 
22  The author recommends the following four sources for background information on the use of the 
Delphi Method and its advantages: Harold A. Linstone and Murray Turoff, The Delphi Method: Techniques 
and Applications, 1ed. (Newark, N.J.: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), 265. Randall B. 
Dunham, Ph. D., The Delphi Technique (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin School of Business, 
1998); “The Delphi Technique,” London, U.K. Available from http://www.britishcouncil.org/learning-
innovation-awards-delphi.; “Prioritization Process Using Delphi Method,” in Carolla Development 
[database online]. 2005 . Available from http://www.carolla.com/wp-delphi.htm. (accessed March 20, 
2005). 
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processes, objectives and strategies are at work. In addition, I identified how 
interagency/interdisciplinary collaborative processes have been implemented or 
institutionalized. These topics were addressed through structured interviews with 
knowledgeable representatives from the following disciplines within the Seattle urban area: 
• Fire Department/ Hazardous Materials 
• Police/ Law Enforcement 
• Public Health and Health Services 
• Emergency Management/ Emergency Operations Center 
 
Phase 3: 
This phase organized these processes and subjected them to a Delphi panel to 
validate the descriptions of collaborative problem solving as articulated by those 
interviewed. This process was brief where consensus was achieved, and lengthy where 
significant differences arose among subject matter. In total, eight subject matter experts 
representing four disciplines were interviewed resulting in approximately 26 hours of 
taped transcripts. 
Phase 4: 
Based on the literature, the resulting discipline-specific models were developed 
and critiqued. These critiques address the structure of the models, the components of the 
models, and the consistencies or inconsistencies of the models with those in the literature. 
Phase 5: 
This phase synthesized the discipline-specific models into a jurisdictional 
summary that incorporates the elements and processes consistent with the discipline-
specific models and with the literature. Clearly, some compromises were necessary. 
Some elements were completely incompatible. Those will not be deleted but retained for 
possible inclusion in other emerging models. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
This thesis seeks to address the imbalance between current and necessary 
terrorism response capabilities in the Seattle urban area. By examining the perspectives 
of each key discipline in the context of a complex, interrelated system, strengths and gaps 
11 
in relationships emerged. Chapter II introduces the perspectives of Seattle area law 
enforcement agencies. Subsequent chapters examine the perspectives of public health, 
emergency management, and municipal fire service agencies. Chapter VI lays out the 
summary argument and offers conclusions and recommendations to strengthen 
interagency collaboration in the Seattle urban area. 
Potential solutions to identified collaboration challenges that emerged from the 
research process include recommended best practices, policy recommendations for 
Seattle area agencies, and recommended changes to the Seattle urban area strategy. The 
author’s operational experience, including recent participation in several multi-agency 
projects and exercises in the Seattle area, has led to the conclusion that the Seattle urban 
area has been successfully and effectively practicing and demonstrating readiness. 
However, increasing future collaborative efforts among public safety agencies is an 
essential ingredient for maintaining the Seattle urban area’s leadership role in homeland 
security preparedness. Insights, explanations, and potential solutions identified from this 
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II. LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES 
This chapter examines homeland security collaboration in the Seattle, Washington 
area from the perspective of local, municipal law enforcement agencies. It begins with an 
assessment of the public’s expectations of law enforcement activities following a terrorist 
attack. A description of law enforcement’s homeland security role and organizational 
culture follows. The nature of law enforcement interagency relationships is examined, 
including the collaborative strengths and challenges of policing agencies’ relationships 
with other disciplines. The chapter concludes with analyses of selected elements of the 
National Preparedness System, community oriented policing, and recommendations for 
increased future cooperation between law enforcement agencies and their homeland 
security peers. 
An understanding of how law enforcement interacts with other disciplines in the 
Seattle area homeland security environment is a prerequisite to understanding how to 
enhance preparedness. Our terrorist adversaries, recently described as “malignant” by a 
local police chief, are trained as soldiers, but they fight by violating criminal laws. The 
new enemy expects to encounter American law enforcement; indeed, it has been trained 
to do so. America’s enemies will bring the battle to police officers whether the officers 
have prepared for it or not.23 The remainder of this chapter provides the reader with 
analysis of local law enforcement as a discipline and demonstrates that cooperation with 
other related disciplines is crucial to continued success and increased preparedness. Three 
key findings emerge: 
• Seattle area law enforcement agencies' history with the ICS has helped them 
operate in the interagency environment. 
• Seattle area law enforcement agencies have an opportunity to strengthen 
their relationships with other disciplines by including them in information 
sharing and intelligence operations. 
• Seattle area law enforcement agencies can adapt their traditional community 
oriented policing strategies to assist them with preparedness. 
 
23  Jonathon R. White, Defending the Homeland, ed. Sabra Horne, 1ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson 
Wadsworth Learning, 2004), 117. 
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A. PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS 
Law enforcement Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the Seattle area stated that 
following a terrorist attack, the public expects local law enforcement agencies to engage 
in several important activities. These activities comprise three broad categories: 
providing for the security of citizens and first responders, transmitting public 
information, and coordinating with other agencies and levels of government. Many of the 
public’s post-attack expectations flow from the overarching principles of life safety and 
incident stabilization. The public assumes that law enforcement officers are trained and 
prepared to respond to terrorism incidents. They also expect law enforcement officers to 
be actively engaged in the mechanisms of first response closely related to life safety and 
public protection activities. Following closely after the primary expectation (response), 
the public expects to receive information about the overall “return to normalcy.” The 
public expects law enforcement leaders to communicate with them as soon as possible 
and provide assessment, guidance, and reassurance. Regarding the issuance of post-attack 
public messages, law enforcement leadership representatives felt that: 
The public doesn’t want the news sugar coated. They expect to see their 
leaders on camera pretty quickly after the event – and what they say will be 
very important. The public is not concerned with the “architecture of the 
response.” They don’t necessarily care which jurisdictions are involved. 
That coordinated information should remain “behind the scenes.” It is 
superfluous and irrelevant to the public. They have the desire to see unity of 
effort and commitment among disciplines and levels of government.24 
Following life safety, incident stabilization, and public communication activities, 
the public expects law enforcement agencies to be engaged in activities that will 
minimize the effects of the attack on individuals, prevent further damage, and restore 
government services as quickly as possible. Providing for basic human needs (shelter, 
safety, and critical supplies), protecting critical infrastructure, and conserving property 
are additional expectations. In addition, the public expects law enforcement agencies to 
conduct investigations, perform any necessary apprehensions, and collaborate with other 
disciplines and levels of government while engaged in these efforts. 
 
 
24 Deputy Chief Clark Kimerer, Seattle Police Department, in discussion with the author, August, 
2005. 
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B. DEFINING LAW ENFORCEMENT’S HOMELAND SECURITY ROLE 
Although there are more than 600,000 law enforcement officers in the United 
States and thousands of state and local police departments, their formal homeland 
security role is unclear. In other countries, law or tradition codifies the role of police, but 
in the United States, law enforcement’s role in times of national crisis is not readily 
defined.25 Although complete role clarity has yet to be achieved, law enforcement 
agencies have been identified most closely with the following activities: protection of the 
public and other first responders, terrorism prevention and intelligence, terrorism 
investigations and apprehensions, maintaining incident scene security, and the restoration 
of order.26 The observation that law enforcement’s roles and the public’s expectations of 
them are closely aligned suggests that police agencies perform a vital mission based on 
perceived community needs. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security requires all first responder 
disciplines to engage in terrorism prevention. 27 Yet compared with other disciplines, law 
enforcement agencies are perhaps the most qualified to accept and fulfill this role, 
followed by public health. Research from the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police suggests that police officers are struggling to embrace their new terrorism 
prevention role. Law enforcement agencies are differentiated from other emergency 
responders because of their role in the prevention of incidents, but police officers feel 
much more prepared to respond to, rather than prevent a terrorist attack.28 Chris Bellavita, 
who teaches introductory homeland security at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, has observed that preventing terrorism is a new role for public 
safety agencies. First responders are used to responding to daily emergencies, not 
 
25 White, Defending the Homeland, 5. 
26 Online survey conducted August 1-September 15, 2005 by the author. Survey respondents are 
participants in the Office for Domestic Preparedness Secure Portal Website, https://odp.esportals.com. 
Approximately sixty homeland security professionals representing thirty states and four disciplines 
responded. (accessed August 1, 2005) 
27  Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2002), 2. 
28  Homeland Security Preparedness Survey (Washington, D.C.: The International Association of 
Chiefs of Police, 2004), 2. 
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stopping acts of war. As a generalization, one can say they tend to avoid prevention 
because they already know how to do response.29 
Law enforcement’s historical involvement with criminal intelligence should 
provide transitional experience that lends itself readily to terrorism prevention. 
Intelligence fusion and terrorism prevention are linked through daily police activities like 
detecting, investigating, and responding to acts of crime.30 Graham Allison of Harvard’s 
Kennedy School of Government describes the importance of the local law enforcement 
intelligence role as follows: “In the war on terrorism, the long pole in the tent is fine-
grained, local intelligence, the same kinds of tips from the same kinds of sources that lead 
to drug busts and other law enforcement successes.”31 Because of their investigative and 
intelligence capabilities, law enforcement agencies have the unique opportunity to strike 
terrorists before they can attack.32 The specific homeland security role of local law 
enforcement agencies will likely differ in the future from their historic and more 
traditional role of crime-fighting and the maintenance of order. Increased awareness of 
the need for compiling essential information on those who threaten the safety of all 
Americans has changed the profession’s role from solely fighting crime and disorder to 
include combating terrorism.33 
 
C. LAW ENFORCEMENT’S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
An understanding of law enforcement culture is necessary to best examine its 
interaction and collaboration with other disciplines. The way police officers view 
themselves, their organizations, and the way they are perceived by other disciplines 
provides insight into interagency collaboration successes and challenges. Law 
 
29  Christopher Bellavita, “What is Preventing Homeland Security?” Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 1 
(2005): 4. 
30 The goal is to produce “all-source” or “fusion” intelligence, which is based on as many collection 
sources as possible in order to compensate for the shortcomings of each and to profit from their combined 
strength. Fusion intelligence reflects collection in depth. Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to 
Policy 2 ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 55. 
31  Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, 1ed. (New York, NY: 
Henry Holt and Company, 2004), 181. 
32  White, Defending the Homeland, 59. 
33  David L. Carter, The Law Enforcement Intelligence Function: State, Local, and Tribal Agencies, 
June, 2005ed. (Washington, D.C.: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 2005), 8-14. 
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enforcement culture relies heavily on organizational structure and “lines of 
accountability.” Officers tend to value hierarchical aspects of supervision and personal 
discipline. Police officers view chain of command structures as necessary and effective 
elements of organizational functioning. They are accustomed to working alone in 
distributed and decentralized patrol networks. 
This “solo” characteristic exists in stark contrast to firefighters who work in teams 
or in groups of teams. The often solitary nature of police work is further highlighted by 
the duties of Washington State Patrol (WSP) officers, where a single officer may patrol 
an entire county by him or herself. Law enforcement officers exercise considerable 
individual discretion when operating on emergency calls. Terrorism, like special events, 
changes the equation bringing hundreds of officers together in a single function.34 
A Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) Master’s thesis by Douglas 
Templeton has examined homeland security disciplines including the law enforcement 
culture. The following is a brief summary of his findings: 
• Law enforcement officers view themselves as the ultimately responsible 
party (to the exclusion of other emergency service partners) at major 
incidents. 
• Law enforcement officers tend to view most major incidents as crime 
scenes. 
• Law enforcement officers work primarily and routinely as individuals (one 
riot, one Ranger.) 
• Law enforcement culture reinforces independent action over coordinated 
teamwork.35  
Law enforcement culture is significantly different from the cultures of other 
homeland security disciplines. Public health, the fire service, and emergency 
management cultures are different because they perform different tasks and are evaluated 
on different criteria. Understanding and appreciating the differences in organizational 
cultures is key to formulating positive policy recommendations. 
 
34 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence Function), 111. 
35  Douglas R. Templeton, “Assessing the Utility of Work Team Theory in a Unified Command 
Environment at Catastrophic Incidents” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 30. 
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D. LAW ENFORCEMENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER HOMELAND 
SECURITY DISCIPLINES 
Local law enforcement agencies in the Seattle area have both formally and 
informally demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with other disciplines and levels of 
government. Formal interagency cooperation goals are reflected in the Seattle Disaster 
Readiness and Response Plan, mutual aid agreements, and various other regional and 
Washington state plans. Mayor Gregory Nickels, who provides public safety oversight in 
Seattle, recently codified his commitment towards interagency cooperation by formally 
adopting the NIMS in June, 2005.36 
Kayyem et al. urge joint planning among agencies in law enforcement, public 
health, emergency services, and private industry on the local level. They believe general 
plans designed by local officials will serve as a guide during a crisis. Planning is a 
general response to a local problem and it is a local responsibility.37 
Although interagency cooperation is practiced, reflected in written plans, and 
reinforced through regular meetings, cooperation problems still exist. Commitment is 
defined by the quality of the participation, not necessarily the quantity. Law enforcement 
officials reported difficulty in obtaining the meaningful participation of other agencies 
they deemed necessary and valuable to the process of preparedness. A 2003 Century 
Foundation report on homeland security progress in the state of Washington found that: 
Region based implementation of cooperative efforts may be problematic 
because of resistance by locally elected officials, lack of trust between 
officials in different jurisdictions or disciplines, and competition over 
resources. The report also indicated that mutual aid agreements are still 
predominantly based on single disciplines (that is, law enforcement 
agencies in different jurisdictions) coordinating their activities and are not 
yet multidisciplinary (that is, law enforcement, public health, emergency 
management agencies both within and between jurisdictions) in their 
approach.38 
 
36  Gregory J. Nickels, Executive Order: 02-05 National Incident Management System (Seattle, WA: 
City of Seattle, Office of the Mayor, 2005), 1. 
37  White, Defending the Homeland, 8. 
38 Steven D. Stehr, “Homeland Security in the State of Washington: A Baseline Report on the 
Activities of State and Local Governments,” The Century Foundation (2003), 26. 
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1. Law Enforcement Coordination with Public Health 
Law enforcement officials are concerned about interactions with public health 
agencies and health-related terrorism issues. Interestingly, police and public health 
organizations depend on each other and therefore have a mutually necessary relationship. 
Police officials need specialized guidance from health experts, and public health 
organizations need enforcement “muscle” provided by the police. The Seattle Police 
Department (SPD) rates public health among the top three priorities surrounding 
terrorism prevention and response. These issues include patient isolation and quarantine, 
patient and facility decontamination, and the potential under-capacity of hospitals. The 
ability of hospitals to manage an influx of patients following an attack is called “surge 
capacity.” Representatives from both law enforcement and public health organizations 
stated that they will need to increase future collaborative efforts to achieve successful 
incident outcomes. 
Although both public health and law enforcement disciplines protect the public, 
their work is quite different. The similarities and differences in pubic health and law 
enforcement investigations have to be understood and coordinated so that both can be 
most effective.39 While law enforcement values the quasi-military decision making model 
that their hierarchy provides, the public health culture values decision making by 
consensus. The aim of public health is to collect data that will satisfy the scientific and 
medical communities, while law enforcement aims to collect evidence that will meet 
legal standards and result in successful prosecutions. The differing nature of their work 
and the standards to which that work is held can pose difficulties, on occasion, when 
public health and law enforcement officials conduct joint investigations. These 
difficulties can be addressed within the public health and law enforcement communities 
by understanding each other’s approaches, communicating effectively, and making 
thoughtful preparations, including testing the system through exercises. 
Seattle area law enforcement agencies have taken action by increasing contact 
through federally-funded training exercises. Public health representatives in the Seattle 
 
39  Jay C. Butler et al., “Collaboration between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms 
and Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 8, no. 10 (2002): 
1153-1154. 
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area reported a significant increase in law enforcement cooperation over the last several 
years, which will improve collaboration during crises.40 The most important aspect of the 
law enforcement role in health-related terrorism issues is to support the public health 
system. Local chiefs and sheriffs should have regular contact with public health officials 
to ensure realistic responses from law enforcement. Quarantine policy is of prime 
importance in the event of contagious disease.41 
 
2. Law Enforcement Coordination with the Fire Service 
The law enforcement and fire service communities share many aspects of 
organizational culture. The optimal relationship between the two is best described as a 
“healthy and competitive sibling rivalry.” Organizational and rank structure, disciplinary 
procedures, and accoutrements of uniform convey the civil authority vested in personnel. 
Civil service laws serve to insulate them from political winds. Fire and police share the 
quasi-military culture.42 
Law enforcement agencies and fire departments have a long history of working 
closely together in the Seattle area. Their shared history has provided benefits resulting 
from inter-agency familiarity, and role and organizational cultural similarities. Providing 
capable chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) response to the 
community depends on police and fire departments working together. Fire departments are 
closely associated with scene control and incident stabilization, while police departments 
are closely associated with scene security and the restoration of order. During a Weapon of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) response, both disciplines will share responsibility for life safety 
and incident stabilization. Determining and dividing the exact domains of law enforcement 
and the fire service is difficult because of these shared roles. 
Peter Manning, in his analysis of the police mandate, defines an occupational 
mandate as “the professional right to claim expertise in a certain area.”43 Regarding 
 
40  Jay C. Butler et al., “Collaboration between Public Health and Law Enforcement: New Paradigms 
and Partnerships for Bioterrorism Planning and Response,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 8, no. 10 (2002): 
1154. 
41  White, Defending the Homeland, 97. 
42  Templeton, Assessing the Utility of Work Team Theory, 33. 
43  Templeton, Assessing the Utility of Work Team Theory, 57. 
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terrorism response, law enforcement’s occupational mandate is overall scene security, 
explosives remediation, and incident investigation. Criminologist Jonathon White offered 
his assessment of the appropriate role of law enforcement in responding to a WMD attack: 
WMDs represent a massive challenge to state and local infrastructures. In 
addition, the role of law enforcement on every level changes in the event 
of a WMD attack. Law enforcement is not equipped to manage the results 
of WMD attacks, and it does not have the expertise to recognize the nature 
of the event. It is counterproductive to try to develop these skills in the law 
enforcement community because they are highly specialized – and the 
knowledge for responding exists in other bureaucracies. Law enforcement 
has two critical roles in a WMD attack. The police should support 
agencies responding to a WMD attack and investigate the attack.44 
Law enforcement agencies in the Seattle area have recently taken a more active 
role in WMD response preparations. Approximately two hundred SPD officers have been 
trained and equipped to function in a hazardous atmosphere, called the hot zone. SPD has 
plans to train and equip two hundred additional officers. By directing both the fire and 
police department to concentrate on WMD response, the city of Seattle has added depth 
to its response system. Complementary skill sets are being developed by both disciplines. 
The City of Seattle’s newly established Joint Hazard Assessment Team (JHAT) consists 
of members from SFDs hazardous materials response team and SPDs SWAT team and 
bomb/arson unit. Also, the SFDs hazardous material team provides decontamination 
services for police officers exiting hot zones, and law enforcement officers support 
firefighters during certain monitoring situations.45 These supportive, not duplicative, 
arrangements provide extra capacity and safeguards. This is known as the “belt and 
suspenders” approach.46 
 
3. Law Enforcement Coordination with Emergency Management 
Emergency management agencies are defined as organizations, both local and 
state, directed to coordinate the reduction and mitigation of the loss of life and property 
due to disasters and emergencies. They protect critical infrastructure from all types of 
 
44  Templeton, Assessing the Utility of Work Team Theory, 92. 
45  Hazardous materials response, which has many physical similarities to WMD response, has 
traditionally been a fire department activity. 
46  Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, 55. 
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hazards through a comprehensive, risk-based, emergency management program of 
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.47 In Seattle, the emergency management 
agency is contained within the police department structure. In King County, emergency 
management is a stand-alone agency and serves a more regional function, providing 
services to thirty-nine cities. In both jurisdictions, the emergency management function 
serves as the coordinating body for the elected official, and the hub for inter-jurisdictional 
coordination. Law enforcement agencies coordinate with emergency management as one 
of many Emergency Support Functions (ESF). 
 
E. LAW ENFORCEMENT’S PERCEPTION OF COLLABORATION 
BARRIERS 
Law enforcement agencies in the Seattle area reported overall success with their 
interagency and interdisciplinary collaborative relationships. However, they also reported 
certain instances of difficulty in maintaining collaborative relationships. The general 
barriers to collaboration were described as incompatible technological systems, 
parochialism, and “jurisdictional creep.” For example, during the second Top Officials 
(TOPOFF 2) training exercise, certain aspects of the law enforcement interaction between 
the Seattle Police Department and the King County Sheriff’s Office were described as 
problematic. A “lack of clarity” related to jurisdictional authority was reported. The 
specific criticism was that certain jurisdictions represented in the exercise did not 
participate as productively as anticipated or required. 
This complaint is not specific to law enforcement in the Seattle area. A national 
homeland security audience was questioned about collaboration barriers, and they 
reported similar results. When asked about collaboration barriers in their jurisdictions, the 
national audience reported that “city-county turf wars” and “a lack of meaningful 
participation in drills, exercises, training sessions, and long term planning” was a 
problem in their jurisdictions. In addition, the national survey results showed that a “lack 
of trust and recognition related to security clearances” and “muscle flexing by federal 
 
47 William V. Pelfrey, “Appendix to “Homeland Security Disciplines and the Cycle of Preparedness”,” 
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2, no. 1 (2005): 2. 
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agencies” are problems associated with law enforcement; however, these problems were 
not reported from the Seattle area.48 
 
F. LAW ENFORCEMENT’S PERCEPTIONS OF THE NATIONAL 
PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM 
At the time of this writing, the National Preparedness System is under 
development within the DHS. It holds significant implications for the operations and 
priorities of homeland security officials, emergency managers, and first responders. The 
National Preparedness System documents and the procedures they contain will guide 
federal funding allocation decisions, direct federal and non-federal efforts to build 
emergency response capabilities, and establish the means by which homeland security 
priorities will be set. 
Six basic documents comprise the National Preparedness System. These are the 
National Preparedness Goal (NPG) (in draft at the time of this writing), the NPS, the 
Universal Task List (UTL), the TCL, the NRP, and the NIMS.49 Law enforcement 
agencies in the Seattle area were asked to comment on selected portions of the National 
Preparedness System, including the NPS, the NIMS and the ICS language it contains. 
Law enforcement and local governments from around the Seattle area have actively 
participated in federal government preparedness programs from the onset. The 
International Association of Chiefs of Police has stated that it is critical for America’s 
law enforcement community to be prepared to help prevent another terrorist attack. It 
needs the appropriate funding, equipment, training, and interagency communication 
mechanisms to secure our nation’s communities effectively.50 
Historically, Seattle area law enforcement agencies have willingly engaged the 
ODP grant requirements to benefit from the financial assistance and guidance 
commensurate with participation. However, strong debate is currently occurring locally 
 
48 Online survey conducted August 1-September 15, 2005 by the author. Survey respondents are 
participants in the Office for Domestic Preparedness Secure Portal Website, https://odp.esportals.com. 
Approximately sixty homeland security professionals representing thirty states and four disciplines 
responded. (accessed August 1, 2005) 
49  Keith Bea, The National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 2005) 2. 
50  Homeland Security Preparedness Survey, 1. 
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and nationally over the relevance, credibility, and applicability of the components of the 
National Preparedness System. Consideration of the grant requirements and funding 
benefits are “on the scales.” Urban areas, including Seattle, are questioning whether the 
benefits are worth the costs of participation. Bellavita describes the current debate: 
The executive branch of the national government is embarking on a multi-
year effort to convince states and cities to obey the expanding dictates of 
HSPD 8 if they want to continue to receive homeland security funding. 
More than one city is quietly doing the benefit cost analysis to determine 
whether getting homeland security money is worth the organizational and 
other costs to satisfy grant requirements.51 
This suggests that the National Preparedness System has not fully addressed the 
issues currently facing law enforcement agencies. First, the NIMS is examined. Next, law 
enforcement agencies’ perceptions of the NPS follow. 
 
1. Law Enforcement and NIMS/ICS 
The ICS originated in the Western U.S. in the wildfire arena in the 1970’s, and it 
took the state of California twenty years to fully embrace it, so it is logical to expect that 
nationwide acceptance of NIMS/ICS will take significantly longer. Seattle area law 
enforcement agencies have a relatively long history of using the ICS when compared to 
other U.S. cities. They rate it as a highly useful tool and claim to have been using it since 
1994. Its use is mandated in organizational policies and is citywide policy in Seattle’s 
case. SPD leadership described the ICS as “gospel” and stated that its use is embraced by 
the membership. They also claim patrol officers make value judgments about superior 
officers based on their ability to use NIMS/ICS effectively.52 
The familiarity and acceptance of the NIMS/ICS wanes as you move east across 
the country. As a broad generalization, there are three zones of NIMS acceptance. These 
zones roughly extend from the West Coast to the Rocky Mountains, from the mountains  
 
 
51  Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: The Issue-Attention Cycle,” Homeland 
Security Affairs 1, no. 1 (2005), 2. 
52 The Incident Command System (ICS) language is contained in the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) and can be considered its predecessor. NIMS/ICS can be viewed as one system for the 
purposes of this discussion. 
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to the Mississippi river, and from the river to the east coast. Regarding NIMS/ICS, these 
“zones of acceptance” moving east can be described as fully accepting, somewhat 
accepting, and suspicious. 
 
2. Law Enforcement and the National Planning Scenarios 
The federal government has developed and released fifteen planning scenarios for 
use in state and local homeland security preparedness activities. The scenarios are 
described as all-hazards, but the majority of them are related to terror attacks. The 
scenarios are designed as a planning tool for state and local governments and have been 
offered as representative of the range of potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters 
that face our nation. Law enforcement officials from the Seattle area were asked to 
comment on their usefulness, value, realism, and collaboration-generating potential. 
Their responses indicated that while they value the scenario based training 
process, the value of the NPS is severely limited because the scenarios lack realism and 
credibility. Officials also indicated that only selected scenario elements have been used or 
will be used for planning and training purposes. SPD leaders stated that the process of 
conducting a scenario that agencies can use to work together and reasonably manage is a 
very worthwhile, educational, and instructive experience. However, they also indicated 
that the scenarios in their current format are neither predictive of real events nor 
contributive to the preparedness process: 
They are not realistic predictions. They are overblown, overboard, and not 
applicable. They are not as scalable as they need to be. The theory and 
concept of scenario based training is good, but the application needs work. 
The scenario authors didn’t know much about what is needed at the local 
level. The authors, while all certified experts, were federal or federally 
contracted people – there wasn’t nearly enough local representation. I 
question the plausibility of some of the larger scenarios. Smaller jurisdictions 
should have put forth two or three of the scenarios at a minimum.53 
The Seattle area law enforcement community was more concerned with local 
maritime, communications, and transportation vulnerabilities than with the existing 
package of national scenarios. They rated the Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive 
 
53 Delphi panel member and law enforcement subject matter expert, in discussion with the author, 
August 2005. 
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Device (VBIED) and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) scenarios as the most useful 
and plausible. They did see potential value in using the scenarios as templates for 
adaptation to meet local needs. Overall, the scenarios were described as monumental, 
notional, and of limited value. The scenario based training process was validated, but the 
NPS as they currently exist were not. There is no evidence that law enforcement agencies 
view them as a “driver” of collaboration. 
 
G. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING 
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has defined community policing 
as a philosophy that focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police 
services that include the aspects of traditional law enforcement as well as prevention, 
problem-solving, community engagement, and partnerships. Community oriented 
policing is not in itself a tactic or strategy, but instead a philosophical approach to how 
policing is conducted.54 
In Seattle, community oriented policing is a philosophy that designates the police 
precincts as the center of deployment, not headquarters. The precincts are closely 
connected with the neighborhoods they serve, and the precinct captains have the authority 
to act as the “Chiefs of Police” for their neighborhoods. This empowers the captains to 
solve community problems, provide tailored police services, and remain closely 
connected to the community. Using that model, each precinct captain can delegate 
authority and create community partnerships, being fully supported by headquarters. 
The precise recipe for adapting existing community oriented policing strategies to 
meet homeland security challenges is unclear. In the face of unknown future terrorist 
threats, local law enforcement organizations will have to adapt existing policing 
strategies to fulfill homeland security requirements. The claim that community policing 
enhances terrorism prevention has not been proven. In fact, little research specifically 




54  Jose Docobo, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at 
the Local Law Enforcement Level,” Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 1 (2005), 2. 
27 
                                                
strategy for homeland security. However, Ronald Timmons, a public safety official from 
Plano, Texas, believes there are opportunities to integrate community policing concepts 
with homeland security initiatives: 
The best opportunity to disrupt an attack will be twofold: deterrence by 
providing such a close watch that would-be perpetrators will be dissuaded 
or go elsewhere. 
–Or– 
People with prior knowledge of a terror plot, living within closed 
communities, will feel comfortable enough to report what they know to a 
trusted official. 
Timmons continues with an additional explanation of community policing benefits: 
Community policing helps to establish rapport, by facilitating 
communication through trust. A casual conversation can lead to what I 
would call “inadvertent intelligence,” whereby someone alludes to 
something of seemingly minor insignificance, but when collected in its 
entirety, it points to something very useful. Unless officers are present at 
that community forum or neighborhood event, the opportunities to learn 
such things are limited.55 
Arguably, monitoring potential terrorist activity in a community can be compared 
to shooting at a moving target, because terrorist groups change tactics. Community 
policing strategies should give law enforcement agencies the best chance to stay abreast 
of any important developments. We know that terrorists systematically search for 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities, seeking out “chinks in the armor” of society. Adaptations 
that terrorist groups make in their operations can render indicators used by intelligence 
and law enforcement to track and gauge the terrorists’ activities obsolete.56 
There is also a connection between community policing and interagency 
collaboration. The city of Seattle is moving beyond community oriented policing and 
looking towards community oriented government. For example, Seattle combined the 
police, fire, licensing, and building departments with a group of community activists to 
tackle escalating violence associated with nightclubs in the Pioneer Square district. A 
 
55  Ronald P. Timmons, Community Policing, Online Discussion. (Monterey, CA: Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security, 2005), http://www.chds.us. (accessed August 30, 2005), 2. 
56  Brian A. Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction: Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and 
Its Implications for Combating Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 50. 
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task force, comprised of community members and government officials was formed to 
resolve the problem. The community’s concern about street violence at nightclubs 
required action from several city departments, including the alcohol control board and the 
mayor’s office. Although this issue has not been completely resolved yet, the community 
has benefited from the process. Pairing government agency representatives with 
community residents in this inclusive and cooperative process has proven useful. 
 
H. HOMELAND SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
Law enforcement agencies in the Seattle area are already engaged in the kind of 
activities conducive to productive inter-agency relationships. No glaring problems or 
omissions related to law enforcement agencies’ collaborative efforts were identified. 
However, there are things they can do to enhance relationships with other disciplines and 
increase overall preparedness. The following recommendations include strengthening 
existing relationships, increasing participation in multi-agency drills, becoming more 
inclusive regarding intelligence, and adapting community oriented policing principles to 
meet homeland security goals. 
 
1. Strengthening Existing Linkages with other Disciplines 
Law enforcement officers are ultimately charged with protecting the public. Their 
effectiveness at being “preventers” of terrorism, first responders, and investigators will 
only be as effective as their relationships with other elements of the homeland security 
system and members of the public. Few law enforcement goals are achievable in 
isolation. Law enforcement agencies should strengthen their existing linkages with other 
disciplines to enhance their own effectiveness and the overall preparedness of the 
homeland security system. This effort can best be accomplished along three fronts: 
continued interagency dialogue at the upper management level, increased participation in 





                                                
2. Increasing Participation in Multi-Agency Exercises 
Law enforcement agencies should increase their participation in multi-agency 
drills and exercises. Law enforcement leadership reported that joining with other 
disciplines for periodic drills and exercises was the best way to increase preparedness and 
represented the best investment of time and money. Also, these exercises benefit the most 
members at the most organizational levels. Periodic, high level interaction meetings are 
quite effective for department leaders but they provide benefits to only a few individuals. 
Law enforcement leadership was asked to describe the best mechanisms for integrating 
disciplines and about the desired frequency of interactions. They reported that “everyday” 
cooperation would likely be too much. They warned of danger in focusing too much on 
one challenge to the exclusion of others, or of creating a “continual focus” on terrorism. 
Participation in multi-agency exercises achieves the best results for the time, staffing, and 
financial expenditures. These activities should be increased because, by all accounts, they 
are the most effective method for gaining results. 
 
3. Including Other Disciplines in Intelligence and Information Sharing 
Law enforcement agencies should work to increase information sharing within the 
law enforcement discipline and, also, work to include other disciplines in the process. 
Despite the police fetish for secrecy, the reasons for not sharing intelligence crashed into 
the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.57 The prevention challenge facing police 
agencies is critical. Detecting a terror plot or plan ahead of time and preventing it from 
occurring, although difficult, is not impossible. This immensity of the challenge has been 
described as “looking for a needle in a haystack of needles.”58 White describes the value 
of focusing on prevention through intelligence, as compared with having to provide a 
response after the attack: 
If law enforcement intelligence capabilities were increased; if cooperation 
among law enforcement agencies increased; if law enforcement agencies 
developed systems to share information; if national intelligence agencies 
could establish secure links with law enforcement agencies; if law 
enforcement’s role in national defense was recognized; it might be possible 
 
57  White, Defending the Homeland, 81. 
58  Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, 119. 
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to strike at organizations that would use WMD prior to their employment. 
Such an approach would require a shift in the way Americans viewed police 
officers and the way police officers viewed their jobs.59 
Brannon describes the challenge of maintaining the integrity of intelligence 
channels while also trying to provide police officers with the information they need to 
perform their prevention jobs: 
Local and state law enforcement departments have been responsible for 
preventing and stopping many terrorist attacks. This is not surprising 
given the fact that local police are constantly in contact with the public. 
Local law enforcement could provide an even greater service in this realm, 
but the classification of sensitive information often excludes the very 
people who come in contact with the terrorists from knowing whom they 
are dealing with.60 
Firefighters and public health workers, like police officers, are in frequent contact 
with the public. Law enforcement agencies should include these disciplines in their 
intelligence process. There are tangible barriers to accomplishing this goal, but the goal is 
worth pursuing. Other disciplines tend to lack security clearances, methods for storing 
and disseminating intelligence, and the necessary training to safely manage intelligence. 
Arguably, the other disciplines have not demonstrated the required readiness to be 
included in intelligence operations. Law enforcement agencies should provide the 
leadership to reach out and integrate these disciplines as valued partners in the process. 
 
4. Adapting Community Oriented Policing Strategies to Meet Homeland 
Security Goals 
Law enforcement agencies should take the knowledge and experiences gained 
from previous community oriented policing strategies and adapt them to meet future 
homeland security challenges. Although a causal link between community policing and 
terrorism prevention has not yet been established, police agencies have been encouraged 
to apply similar principles to terrorism prevention by the federal government. 
Specifically, law enforcement agencies should use community policing initiatives, 
strategies, and tactics as a basis to identify suspicious activities related to terrorism. In 
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31 
                                                
addition, officers should ensure that community members are aware of the means and 
processes for relaying observed data to them.61 
Under community policing, police agencies are expected not only to cooperate 
with citizens and communities but also to actively solicit input and participation.62 A 
recently published training guide, directed at combating suicide terrorism, also stresses 
the importance of developing close ties between officers and community members: “Law 
enforcement officers should actively encourage and cultivate cooperation by building 
strong ties with community leaders – elected officials, civil servants, clerics, businessmen 
and teachers among others – and thereby enlist their assistance and support.”63 The same 
community policing philosophy that stresses relationships, responsiveness, and a strong 
connection to the community will provide homeland security dividends just as it has for 
more traditional law enforcement goals. 
 
I. CONCLUSION 
Law enforcement agencies in the Seattle area have the advantage of pre-existing, 
regional relationships with each other, with other disciplines and with other levels of 
government. They should increase the frequency and complexity of interagency exercises 
to capitalize on that advantage. 
Their prior experience with the ICS will help them transition to using the NIMS 
effectively with other disciplines. Strengthening the ability to provide policing services in 
hazardous atmospheres will add depth to regional systems by providing complementary 
skills. However, law enforcement cannot shoulder the entire burden alone. Homeland 
security challenges require them to increase interagency participation and cooperation to 
even greater levels. 
The role of law enforcement organizations is changing from crime-fighting and 
maintenance of order to the prevention of terrorism and information sharing with other 
 
61  The Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security: Prevention and 
Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: Office for Domestic Preparedness, 2003), 7. 
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agencies. As law enforcement agencies adapt to their new role, other disciplines have an 
opportunity to support them. This support and the experience it provides will benefit the 
entire Seattle area homeland security system. 
By adapting community oriented policing successes and applying them to current 
homeland security challenges, law enforcement agencies can become more engaged in 
prevention. By developing non-traditional intelligence partnerships, law enforcement 
agencies can gain and share more information. Transitioning from a “need to know” to a 
“need to share” attitude will enhance overall preparedness. 
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III. PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine homeland security collaboration from 
the perspective of the public health discipline. Seattle-King County Public Health serves 
the Seattle urban area and is located in geographic King County, Washington, which is 
the twelfth largest county in the United States. In addition to serving Seattle, the 
department provides health services to 39 cities, the remainder of unincorporated King 
County, and 127 special purpose districts. Public health’s responsibilities include 
preventing epidemics and the spread of disease, protecting against environmental 
hazards, preventing injuries, promoting and encouraging healthy behaviors, responding to 
disasters and assisting communities in recovery, and assuring the quality and accessibility 
of health services.64 
The remainder of this chapter describes why public health interactions with other 
homeland security disciplines are critically important for increasing preparedness and 
response capabilities. Additionally, it explains how public health agencies have been 
challenged in adapting to the new homeland security environment and their role as “lead 
agency” for health-related incidents. It examines why organizational and cultural 
differences between public health and other disciplines act as barriers to achieving 
progress, and it concludes with recommendations for increasing future collaboration with 
other disciplines. 
This chapter shows that the public health discipline is an “outlier” in comparison 
with its peers. Examining why leads to a detailed explanation of challenges facing public 
health organizations and positive policy recommendations. The public health discipline is 
best described as the “new kid on the block” when viewing the Seattle area homeland 
security environment as a neighborhood. They have experienced “growing pains” 
because their role, interagency work history, and organizational culture are significantly 
different from those of their peer agencies. Important findings include: 
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• Public health organizations have not yet internalized or accepted the 
NIMS/ICS to the necessary degree. 
• The homeland security disciplines examined here have different 
expectations about the practical requirements of being “lead agency” for 
health related incident response. 
• The challenge of managing a rapid influx of patients, known as “medical 
surge,” urgently needs a solution. Certainly, the solution should be built on 
a foundation of teamwork. The active support of public health from fire, 
police, and emergency management is necessary. 
 
A. DEFINING PUBLIC HEALTH’S HOMELAND SECURITY ROLE 
Findings from interviews conducted with Seattle area public safety executives 
representing multiple disciplines revealed confusion surrounding public health’s new 
homeland security role. Should public health personnel be considered first responders? 
Public safety experts representing law enforcement, emergency management, the fire 
service and public health were asked this question and they each offered different 
answers that can be summarized as yes, no, and sometimes. 
Seattle’s Director of Emergency Management, Barb Graff, felt strongly that 
public health employees are and should be considered first responders. She indicated that 
they should be viewed as traditional first responders for a health epidemic. Key homeland 
security policy documents that define the term “first responder” have been amended in 
recent years to include public health personnel because, if not included, then nobody 
remains to respond to and manage an epidemic that affects fire and police departments, 
hospitals, etc. Regardless of what public health personnel are called, clearly defining their 
homeland security role across disciplines is important. 
A police chief described first responders as those in “suits and boots.” He described 
public health as “almost” first responders. A public health SME indicated that public health 
personnel are first responders in certain situations, including when public health personnel 
respond to a communicable disease situation and assess the scope and nature of the event. 
Another health expert defined public health personnel as “second tier” responders, engaged 
in assessing the impact of events on populations, participating at an Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC), and offering health-related expertise to other agencies. 
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The new homeland security role facing public health clearly represents a change from 
their more traditional role. Historically, public health’s role encompassed the full range of the 
medical field. Any kind of illness that affects individuals can be studied by persons in public 
health to detect trends and take measures to decrease illness in populations. Its mission of 
“prevention rather than cure” is universally compelling, saving money and reducing human 
suffering. Their new homeland security mission now includes the need for early detection of 
a bioterrorism release and rapid mobilization for investigation and response.65 Carus 
documented a growing interest in the use of bioterrorism by criminals and terrorists that 
places additional pressure on public health agencies: 
The available evidence indicates that there is an explosion of interest by 
criminals in biological agents. Forty of the 56 confirmed cases occurred in 
the 1990s. Similarly, 19 of 27 confirmed terrorist cases also occurred in 
the 1990s. This suggests a growing interest in biological agents.66 
James Henriksen, from Seattle-King County Public Health, described two phases of 
public health activity, preventative and reactive. The preventative phase encompasses 
proactive activities that occur pre-incident, while the reactive role, during and after the 
event, is more challenging for public health for several reasons. The more traditional 
preventative role for public health included vaccination programs, regulatory functions, 
disease prevention, site inspections, and educational activities. The newer homeland 
security role, which primarily involves reaction, is less clear because of a lack of practical 
experience. Public health’s peer disciplines have questioned their ability to effectively 
respond to catastrophic terrorism and perform the “lead agency” role for incident response. 
Public health has been tasked with “lead agency status” for health-related 
incidents by state and national response plans.67 These incidents, whether terrorist-related 
or naturally occurring, are potentially the kind of events for which the general public is 
least prepared. Stein describes the unique challenges posed by bioterrorism: 
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A bioterrorist event differs in important ways from the crisis events for 
which communities are typically prepared. The level of fear and anxiety in 
the event of a bioterrorism attack may be increased by the novelty of 
biological weapons, the uncertainty in determining whether an attack has 
occurred and identifying the boundaries and scope of the attack, the 
possibility that oneself or one’s family may unknowingly have been a 
victim of the attack, and the possibility of contagion.68 
Public health organizations are generally inexperienced at emergency response. 
Health-related events may be more difficult to identify, define, and control than obvious 
events like explosions. This compounds the challenges facing public health organizations. 
 Seattle area public health experts described their homeland security role as 
preparing for the health consequences of all incidents, determining and leading the health 
response, and providing advice and expertise to members of the unified command team. 
Peer public safety agencies want to see public health embrace their “lead agency status” 
more aggressively by demonstrating readiness to lead a multi-agency response and 
successfully manage a large incident. Public health’s peer agencies want a more thorough 
explanation about how they can be supportive and assist in enacting response plans. They 
want Seattle-King County Public Health to demonstrate their leadership capabilities more 
vigorously in terms of planning and exercising in a multi-disciplinary capacity. This key 
finding highlights three important considerations for public health organizations. First, 
better coordination with their peer agencies is required to clarify specific responsibilities. 
Second, public health organizations need to confirm that the other disciplines’ 
expectations are reasonable and achievable. Third, PH needs to continually educate first 
response agencies and other peers on public health legal authorities, responsibilities, and 
capabilities available during emergencies. 
Interview findings reveal that the source of disagreement among disciplines 
surrounds the meaning of the term “lead agency.” Public health leaders are comfortable 
limiting their role to leading “the health response” while the other disciplines expect 
public health to lead “the entire response.” This incongruity can be addressed by 
increasing cooperation and contact among disciplines at the highest organizational levels.  
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Michael Loehr from Seattle King County Public Health offered his contrary analysis that 
further demonstrates the importance of clarifying roles. Regarding leading responses, 
Loehr stated: 
I have had the exact opposite reaction from first responders in King County. 
In fact, I have never heard a first responder say that they expected PH to serve 
as the Incident Commander for events that include major roles for fire, police, 
or other non-health agencies. For events that are primarily a PH response with 
limited support from fire and police, like establishing a mass dispensing 
center, we have led the entire response as the incident commander. 
Even when public health is not in the lead role, it has another responsibility: to be 
ready to communicate about risk. These communications must be transmitted not only to 
members of the public, but to their physicians and the larger medical services community 
as well. RAND researcher Terri Tanelian found that when it comes to making a personal 
decision about prophylaxis use in the wake of a bioterrorism event, people consult 
multiple sources. The majority of people will consult with their private physician prior to 
making a decision. She found that “non-adherent participants were commonly following 
the advice of private physicians, whereas adherent participants commonly described 
ongoing support from multiple sources when discussing their decisions.” Her findings 
highlight the need for better integration between the public and private health care 
systems during public health crises and the importance of equipping private physicians 
for their key role in aiding decision-making during a public health crisis.69 
 
B. EXAMINING PUBLIC HEALTH’S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
The difficulties public health has in taking a lead role may be traced in part to 
differences in organizational culture. There are striking differences in organizational 
culture that distinguish the public health discipline from their homeland security peers 
like police and fire. Strong consensus emerged from the interviews conducted with public 
health executives about these differences and why they pose challenges for public health 
in the current homeland security environment. The public health discipline is very 
community-focused and consensus based. Historically, they have been tasked with 
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population-based health problems that often have complex and long-term solutions. This 
type of work activity is the antithesis of emergency response, which tends to be fast 
paced and where decisions are based on less than complete information. 
Adapting to this new “emergency response” homeland security environment has 
proved challenging for Seattle-King County Public Health. They have attempted to create 
an internal “cultural shift” by moving from a community and consensus based 
organizational model to an ICS-driven model where input and tactical analysis can yield 
rapid decisions. They have reported some success, but claim additional education, 
training, and practical experience for their staff is necessary. 
Compared with traditional first responders, the public health organizational 
hierarchy is less defined. They exhibit a culture founded in “science based questioning” 
that matches poorly with the “command and control” culture of their peer disciplines. 
Public health has grown comfortable interpreting health trends over longer periods of 
time, analyzing the results of surveillance, and determining health effects on populations. 
They are less comfortable making immediate decisions with incomplete information. 
Because of these differences in organizational culture, emergency scenarios present a 
new challenge for public health. 
When public health experts were asked to describe the organizational cultures of 
their more traditional first responder peers (police and fire), they described them as 
command and control focused, orderly, consistent, and “driven by standards.” Police 
officers and firefighters perform routine emergency response work daily. While 
responding to a terrorism incident represents a natural increase and extension of daily 
activity for traditional responders, any form of emergency response activity is vastly 
different from the kinds of activity performed daily by public health workers. The 
response experience, ongoing training, and command framework that is embedded with 
traditional first responders has not been a part of public health culture or experience. This 





                                                
C. PUBLIC HEALTH’S COLLABORATION CHALLENGES 
Public health experts described “relationship building” with peer homeland 
security agencies as an evolutionary process. The linkages between fire, police, and 
emergency management are more established, are more regularly exercised, and have 
more historical experience than those involving public health. Experts representing the 
other three disciplines unanimously reported that public health has made significant 
advances in recent years in terms of interagency cooperation and participation, 
communication, and overall performance. Whether they like it or not, current homeland 
security challenges have created somewhat of a “strange bedfellows” situation between 
public health and their uniformed public safety agency counterparts. Deputy Chief 
Kimerer from the Seattle Police Department (SPD) explained that: 
Much to their chagrin, public health has had to think like cops and 
firefighters. Hospital security shutdowns, decontamination issues, and 
quarantines have required them to operate in a new way.70 
Public health reported that increasing day-to-day exposure with other agencies is 
one area where relationship-building is working. Responding to illegal drug labs together 
with law enforcement has served as the kind of activity that has strengthened 
relationships. Partnering with law enforcement, public health ensures that contaminated 
properties have been adequately cleaned prior to re-occupancy. 
For many public health officials, responding to the rising threat of bioterrorism 
and recent attacks has necessitated a steep learning curve.71 Seattle-King County Public 
Health, like public health departments nationwide, has experienced a host of challenges 
and barriers in adapting to the threat of terrorism and naturally occurring disease 
outbreaks. Competition for scarce resources, managing surge capacity, the mass 
distribution of prophylactics, an industry wide lack of performance standards, difficulties 
experienced implementing legal authorities, and managing numerous jurisdictions are the 
most prominent collaboration challenges facing public health in the Seattle area. 
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1. Competing for Scarce Resources 
Seattle area public health leaders reported that funding problems are a major 
obstacle to achieving progress and increased capability.72 One Seattle area public health 
SME indicated that the Seattle area has done well compared with other regions, but also 
described frustrations associated with the financial allocation process: 
Inherently, the process becomes reduced to a competition between 
jurisdictions and agencies to become prepared. All homeland security 
agencies should be participating equally in developing and guiding 
funding decisions, but that is not happening in our region, to the detriment 
of public health. Every time new funding becomes available, a “feeding 
frenzy” among competing agencies ensues. The Seattle urban area strategy 
has not been effectively used to guide funding decisions. 
When asked which agencies are currently winning and losing in funding 
competition, he reported that: 
Police and fire are winners primarily because of extensive equipment 
purchases. The vast majority of the money has gone to purchasing 
equipment. Although the DHS guidelines have been followed, we have 
operated in a manner that is not conducive to us becoming more prepared 
as a community. 
When asked what public health would do with a larger share of the resources, he 
indicated that he would address the needs of vulnerable populations, like limited English 
speakers, the poor, and the handicapped. Instead of buying equipment, public health has 
worked to build capabilities within their department, not by adding people, but by 
training and building knowledge and skills to conduct isolation and quarantine response, 
to conduct mass vaccination response, to learn the ICS, and to be able to coordinate the 
health response system. 
 
2. Providing for Medical Surge Capacity and Capability 
Public health also faces challenges coordinating with hospitals and other health 
care facilities to develop and exercise plans to manage potentially overwhelming 
 
72 Public Health funding challenges are not unique to the Seattle area. As a result of chronic under 
spending, the public health infrastructure is badly deteriorated. Public health agencies lack the capacity to 
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numbers of patients following an event. Surge capacity is simply defined as the ability of 
the medical system to manage a large and unexpected influx of patients. Managing a 
surge of patients means being able to “lighten the load” on the system by spreading 
patients out, creating vacancies by moving stable patients to outlying hospitals, and by 
using existing hospital space more creatively.73 A Seattle area public health SME 
considered it more advantageous and easier to create vacancies in existing hospitals by 
moving stable patients out than by re-creating hospitals in makeshift settings. It is 
important to note the distinction between public health and hospitals. Public health does 
not equate to or represent hospitals. Although they both share health-related goals, they 
manage different programs and face different challenges. 
A random query of the available number of hospital beds revealed that the Seattle 
area hospital system maintains “just in time” inventory like any other business.74 On an 
average day, King County hospitals are at 80-90 percent patient capacity.75 Tight 
financial margins are an unfortunate reality for the health care industry, both locally and 
nationally. Neither government nor private industry can afford to build empty hospitals. 
The Seattle region has approximately 3,500 staffed hospital beds. Any sizeable influx of 
patients results in stress to the hospital network. When this occurs, the challenge of 
providing adequate patient care becomes an immediate logistical concern. 
How fast can the Seattle area medical system absorb an overload of patients? The 
answer depends on multiple factors including the number, condition, and location of the 
patients and other factors like the existence of an aggressive flu season. When asked how 
many seriously injured or sick patients our system could absorb before apparent failure, a 
public health SME indicated “the real number is about two hundred.” That observation is 
critical because the patient loads forecasted by the National Planning Scenarios are 
dramatically larger. The pandemic influenza scenario predicts 87,000 fatalities and the 
 
73  Medical Surge Capacity and Capability: A Management System for Integrating Medical and Health 
Resources during Large-Scale Emergencies (Washington, D.C.: CNA Corporation, under contract to the 
Dept. of Health and Human Services, 2004), 7. 
74  “Washington Hospital Capacity Web Site,” Seattle, WA August 30, 2005. Available from 
https://capacity.medical.washington.edu.hospital_capacity/hosp_view_BedCensus.asp. (accessed October 10, 2005) 
75  Harborview Medical Center: Report to the Community, ed. David E. Jaffe (Seattle, WA: 
Harborview Medical Center, 2004), 39. There is an important distinction between “beds” and “staffed and 
equipped” beds. 
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aerosol anthrax scenario predicts 13,000.76 Very quickly after an incident, all the television 
news cameras will be focused on public health and the under-capacity of hospitals. 
 
3. Challenges with Mass Prophylactic Distribution 
Another challenge facing the Seattle area public health system is dispensing 
medications to large numbers of residents quickly. Mass prophylactic dispensing is an 
action that will surely require collaboration between disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels 
of government. Existing public health plans to provide antibiotics to large numbers of 
people include multiple strategies such as establishing Points of Dispensing (POD) 
managed and operated by a PH incident commander with support from police and fire, 
pre-deploying medications to first responders and certain critical facilities, and 
developing a residential distribution plan for catastrophic events in conjunction with the 
U.S. Postal Service. 
While mass prophylactic dispensing plans are led by PH and aimed at biologicals, 
a distinctly different program called Chempak© is more reactive and addresses patients 
with chemical and nerve agent exposures. This collaborative dispensing plan relies on 
medical expertise provided by the CDC and the Washington State Department of Health 
and Hospitals and delivery logistics provided by the SFD. The specifics of the program 
are a closely held secret. Although the plan’s existence is promising, it remains untested 
at the time of this writing. An SFD chief involved in the plan’s development described 
the process as “giving birth to a gray whale.”77  The national outlook and capability for 
mass prophylactic distribution is questionable as well: 
A year ago, the Health and Human Services Department launched a $27 
million, twenty-one city program called the “Cities Readiness Initiative” 
to encourage local officials to develop plans for distributing the Strategic 







76  Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries (Washington, D.C.: Homeland Security Council, 2004). 
77 Assistant Chief Bill Hepburn, Seattle Fire Department, in discussion with the author, August, 2005. 
The process to develop and implement the Chempak program was difficult, intensive, and lengthy. 
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in October 2001 killed five people and put the nation on edge, not a single 
city has a workable plan to get supplies to the public in time to save 
lives.78 
 
4. A Lack of Public Health Performance Standards 
Public health lacks emergency response performance standards to guide their 
efforts. In King County, public health preparedness didn’t exist until May, 2002. Before 
then, public health was minimally involved in emergency management and response. A 
written standard that adequately describes “what a prepared public health agency looks 
like” does not exist on a state or federal level. King County Public Health has since 
written a standard for their use. The newly developed preparedness strategy helps guide 
PH efforts, organize personnel, and divide work projects into manageable portions. It also 
helps them define priorities within specific work boundaries and deflect work projects 
imposed on them by others that fall outside the strategy.79 
The apparent lack of standards for public health extends to resources as well. How 
will public health resources be standardized across the country? While standardizing a 
fire apparatus nationally is easy, who will standardize an epidemiologist?80 
 
5. Challenges Implementing Legal Authorities 
Determining and implementing legal authority for health-related emergencies is a 
major policy issue for Seattle-King County Public Health. Local health officers have the 
ultimate authority to issue and enforce isolation and quarantine orders, but their ability to 
garner the necessary support for actions they must undertake has been, at times, difficult. 
Their ability to implement directives is clouded by overlapping jurisdictional authorities, 
the actions of elected officials, and disagreement about the best way to package and 
deliver public messages. These overlapping authorities pose challenges which further 
 
78  Mimi Hall, “Cities Fret Over How to Quickly Deliver Vaccines,” USA Today, 2005, sec. U.S. 
News, 3. Public health SME Michael Loehr criticized this passage as not applicable in King County. He 
stated that the King County plan is workable and has been suitably tested.  
79 Seattle King County Public Health, Preparedness Section, Office of the Director, Public Health 
Preparedness Strategy, Goal 8: Anticipate and Respond to the Public Health Consequences of Local 
Emergencies (Seattle, 2005), 1-2. 
80 Guide for NIMS Resource Typing System, [Draft Document], 2005, Document NIC-GDL-009, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, NIMS Integration Center, Washington, D.C. 
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require PH to closely coordinate with an even broader scope of partners including the 
prosecuting attorney, superior courts, city managers and mayors, the King County 
executive, and others. Taking significant action like closing businesses, schools, or 
stadiums, or limiting access to public areas presents challenges for public health, other 
public safety agencies, and elected officials. Specifically, the legal, political, and 
enforcement ramifications of these decisions, as well as media implications, pose 
challenges for public health organizations. Voluntary compliance with orders, while 
desirable, is not always possible.81 A comprehensive plan to present an appropriate and 
unified message to the public is needed. 
 
6. Ineffective Span of Control 
Public health reported difficulty managing the large number of government clients 
in King County. They struggle to manage the 39 cities, plus the unincorporated county, 
and 127 special purpose districts. This amounts to a major coordination challenge. They 
have, however, managed to place a representative at every homeland security committee 
operating in their overall jurisdiction. Developing processes and systems that are truly 
representative is a collaboration barrier. 
 
7. Participation in Multi-Agency Training and Activities 
Public health SMEs reported that internal funding issues are preventing them 
from increasing multi-agency collaboration. They use a “fee for service” business model. 
The majority of their daily activities are fee generating, so dedicating time for 
participation in multi-agency drills is problematic because of the lack of non-dedicated 
staff time. This represents a unique challenge for public health to overcome and is behind 
their persistent claim of being under-funded. Alternately, another Delphi panel member 
observed that other agencies have had to perform their primary functions in addition to 
participating in multi-agency exercises and training. Therefore, this feature of the PH 
model should not necessarily negatively impact their participation. 
 
81 When voluntary compliance has been unsuccessful in the past, local health officers have taken 
decisive action that included ordering infectious patients into mandatory involuntary isolation and ordering 
medical providers to apply limited flu vaccine in a manner consistent with local public health directives. 
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Public health employees currently have to justify their work schedules in sync with 
the fee-based business model, which is more closely associated with a private sector model 
than those of their peer public safety agencies. Public health staff time dedicated to multi-
agency drills affects permit fees for other activities. This impacts their ability to cultivate 
strong working relationships and to develop a core multi-disciplinary response group. 
 
D. HOW OTHER DISCIPLINES PERCEIVE PUBLIC HEALTH 
While the peer homeland security disciplines freely admit that Seattle King 
County Public Health has made significant strides in recent years, questions about their 
ability to be an effective “lead agency” for incident response remain. The Seattle area fire 
service leadership has specifically questioned what responsibilities accompany the title of 
“lead agency” for a health-related terrorism event. Fire officials indicated that they have 
been dismissed as taking the lead for a large epidemiological response, although they will 
be relied on to treat patients. A fire service SME stated that: 
Traditional first responders will surely see the volume of sick people 
initially. Public health staff are not first responders. They are the surveyors 
and collators of information that solve the puzzle. During a mass 
inoculation situation, public health would organize and be in the lead 
agency role, but would not perform the bulk of the work. The police and 
fire departments would have equally substantial roles. In this instance, 
public health has a major role in unified command. My observation is that 
public health is accustomed to working by themselves on specific health 
issues. We have not seen much evidence that they understand the degree 
of teamwork required. In a dynamic situation, how can you do things 
“medically correct” and still meet the needs of an anxious mother and her 
three kids?82 
The Port of Seattle Chief of Police, Tim Kimsey, works closely with public health 
personnel at Seattle Tacoma International Airport (SeaTac), cruise ship terminals, and other 
locations in the Seattle area. He indicated that public health tends to focus on smaller and 
more contained issues. He indicated that public health should “expand their thinking” to 
include WMD and biological issues. Because SeaTac has been designated as a national 
quarantine point, it is a logical place to focus public health resources and expertise. 
 
 
82 Assistant Chief Bill Hepburn, Seattle Fire Department, in discussion with the author, August 2005. 
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E. PUBLIC HEALTH AND NIMS/ICS 
Other agencies view the ability of public health organizations to use the NIMS 
and the ICS language it contains as a major determinant of future collaborative success.83 
This section explains why the NIMS/ICS has not been internalized by public health 
agencies to the degree it has been by the other disciplines. Public health has accepted 
NIMS/ICS by incorporating it into their existing response plans, but they have yet to fully 
integrate its use. Colonel Sharon Stanley from the U.S. Army War College described 
public health’s relationship with ICS in her Master’s thesis as follows: 
The public health system has the healthcare expertise related to biological 
agents, but it lacks the ability to take command and control of 
consequence management operations. Public health has a lack of 
understanding of ICS beyond familiarization, an established leadership 
style involving consensus building and group decision-making, and an 
unproven track record in leading mass casualty response teams.84 
Although not relied on for everyday department activities, Seattle King County 
Public Health views the ICS as being very effective because it provides the structure and 
consistency needed during emergency incidents. This is instructive because they operate 
in such a different manner on a daily basis. Public health officials describe NIMS/ICS as 
a valuable concept, but they caution that it has not yet been fully implemented, and that 
they are waiting to determine its overall usefulness. Peer disciplines, when asked about 
public health’s transition to NIMS/ICS, expressed frustration. A fire service SME 
commented that “public health is struggling with the ability to do anything more than 
plan. They have been very slow to adopt NIMS and ICS.” A Seattle area public health 
SME explained why public health has experienced difficulty in adopting NIMS/ICS: 
I’m disappointed that the development of NIMS has excluded public health. 
I don’t see a multi-discipline approach or public health fingerprints on any 
part of the NIMS. It is really geared to fire and police, and that’s where it 
stops. Public health and public works are not visible in the NIMS concept. 
 
83 For more detailed information on NIMS/ICS see the following online resources: 
http://www.fema.gov/nims/, http://www.nimsonline.com/, and http://www.fema.gov/nimcast/index.jsp. 
84  Col. Sharon A. Stanley, Operational Art and the Incident Command System: Public Health’s Bridge 
in Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 
2003): 3. 
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He also indicated that a template or a model is necessary for public health 
agencies to use to adapt to the NIMS/ICS system. He continued by describing that not 
surprisingly, NIMS/ICS is more readily useable by the other disciplines because they 
developed it and use it daily: 
The NIMS/ICS is not a language that public health agencies understand. 
When the fire department comes in and provides training they do a great 
job, but they come in and speak ‘fire language.’ Public health doesn’t have 
an Air Operations section. Public health personnel struggle to understand 
the militaristic terminology. Public health activities are so contrary to the 
ICS way of doing things, they are literally opposite. Public health is 
consensus based, long term, and community focused. We are really 
swimming upstream to adapt. Public health personnel are not getting the 
NIMS/ICS training in a language they can readily understand. 
Consider the following three examples offered by another public health expert that 
highlight the difficulties they face in adapting to NIMS/ICS. Consensus based decision-
making differs from the rigid command and control model used in NIMS/ICS. Also 
consider the differing time frames attached to work projects, such as long term smoking 
cessation and community obesity reduction plans contrasted with a four, six, or twelve hour 
Incident Action Plan (IAP). The operational modes also differ. Traditional public health 
activities are ongoing and predictable while NIMS/ICS is used in the crisis mode. 
Michael Loehr from Seattle-King County Public Health described his frustration 
with unified command response plans: 
I have yet to see a single plan in King County that clearly defines and 
states that we are going to operate under unified command. I question 
whether or not it will actually be implemented. I honestly think we are 
going to get into a situation, and it’s going to be incident command and 
not unified command. Regardless of which city (in King County) it 
happens in, the incident is going to be driven by one discipline. They are 
going to see their priorities immediately, and they are not going 
acknowledge the priorities of other agencies and things may not be done 
as efficiently as they could be. 
I think there is a consistent role for fire and police and they are going to be 
pushing themselves into command. In some cases that’s great, in other 
cases there clearly needs to be expertise from other agencies involved in 
decision-making. A white powder hazardous materials incident in a 
building provides a great example. There are decisions that need to be 
made by the health department. King County does not have a specific plan 
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to coordinate between fire, police, and public health. I don’t think it exists. 
Unified command is not ready to be used for public health emergencies.85 
Public health has had some success using the unified command approach, albeit 
on a small scale. James Henriksen from Seattle-King County public health described an 
incident at Alki Beach where he used it successfully: 
Seattle-King County public health was notified of an incident where 
hundreds of hypodermic syringes washed up on a Seattle swimming 
beach. We are responsible for sanitation at swimming beaches. Fire and 
police responded initially. The firefighters swept the beach, picking up the 
hypodermics. The initial incident commander from the fire department 
notified us through the EOC. As part of our response, we set up the 
NIMS/ICS structure. We established an operations section, a 
communications person, and a Public Information Officer (PIO) because 
we anticipated media requests. 
The Seattle Parks Department responded as well and joined the operations 
section. We established a command post at a table in the park. We placed 
barriers, installed signage, and issued a public safety message. We 
developed and implemented an IAP using the unified command approach. 
We closed the beach for two tide changes. We also had a liaison from the 
Washington State Department of Ecology (DOE). He supported the 
incident with information about tides, currents, and the predicted 
trajectory of the hypodermics that remained in Elliott Bay. For public 
health, this was a growth experience. The Alki Beach incident involved 
interfacing with other disciplines, as well as the Washington State EOC 
and DOE. It proved to be a great exercise in communication.86 
 
F. PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE NATIONAL PLANNING SCENARIOS 
The Seattle area public health experts described the impacts that the NPS have 
had on their planning and preparedness efforts, and they offered their perspectives about 
the value and usefulness of the scenarios. Regarding the scenarios’ realism, they felt that 
it varied by scenario. Overall, they rated them as both valuable and useful for planning 
purposes. The scenarios have helped them to “expect the unexpected”, and they provide a 
clear indication of the necessary scope and level of preparedness. 
 
85 Preparedness Section Manager Michael Loehr, Seattle King County Public Health, in discussion 
with the author, August 2005. 
86 James Henriksen, Environmental Health Division, Seattle King County Public Health, in discussion 
with the author, August 2005. 
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Health experts acknowledged that by preparing for the suite of scenarios, they 
would also become better prepared for other events, just as a rising tide lifts all boats. The 
scenarios have helped them to “gear up” for emergency response. They indicated that 
they had used the pandemic influenza scenario the most and that they had committed a 
large amount of resources to preparing for it. Unfortunately, the large numbers of patients 
predicted by the scenarios far exceeds the numbers they have seen in a real event. 
Preparing to treat the vast number of casualties forecasted presents a huge challenge to 
our health system. 
While discussing the scenarios and their meaning for public health, Henriksen 
commented: 
To become fully prepared for something on the order of magnitude 
presented by these scenarios is way off our chart. Look at the resources 
necessary to care for just one person with a communicable disease. It is 
very resource intensive and expensive. In situations like those presented in 
the scenarios our resource needs exponentially multiply. However, we 
realize that and have made great progress in preparedness. As a region, we 
are light-years ahead of where we were even two or three years ago. 
Health experts agreed that the scenarios are driving catastrophic planning, but 
perhaps at the expense of all-hazards planning. Loehr discussed the misguided efforts of 
the federal government in catastrophic planning and how our collective efforts have 
avoided updating plans for more likely events: 
Planning for catastrophic disasters is necessary and a good idea, but that is 
not what we are going to see all the time. We also have to plan for the 
kinds of things we know are going to happen. There has been lots of talk 
about catastrophic [major earthquake] planning after hurricane Katrina. 
Health agencies at the federal level are telling us to prepare for the big 
one. As an example, consider catastrophic bioterrorism relief funding that 
has been distributed to the twenty-one largest cities in the country, 
including King County. They want us to be prepared to respond to treat 
560,000 people in thirty hours. It becomes a logistics operation, moving 
pills and people. The mechanisms to do that are already in place, it has 
nothing to do with the health system. It is more closely connected to the 
U.S. Post Office and staging medicines around the county. 
The federal government equates buying supplies with preparedness. Public 
health thinks it is a waste of money. Consider a meningitis or hepatitis A 
outbreak, or an aerosol dispersal at city hall. Nothing in the scenarios fits 
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with these incidents. Which is more realistic, the doomsday scenario or a 
predictable local event? We should be prepared for the events that are 
more likely to happen. For public health, capability means developing 
skills at the responder level, not purchasing equipment. Focusing on 
decision-making, coordinating with partners, and ensuring the viability of 
the health system is what we should be doing. 
 
G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Homeland security issues related to public health are of major concern to the 
Seattle urban area. This chapter has shown that the new homeland security role for public 
health is faster paced, more complex, and more challenging for them than their traditional 
role. Their traditional role primarily involved observing and mitigating community health 
hazards. This new role has not been clearly defined for the Seattle area homeland security 
community, nor is it readily identifiable in guiding policy documents, including the 
Seattle urban area strategy. 
Public health’s homeland security relationships with other public safety 
disciplines have required them to adopt the NIMS/ICS management style. NIMS/ICS is 
nationally recognized as a unifying incident management tool, yet learning it, practicing 
with it, and internalizing it has presented a significant challenge for them. Unlike their 
peers, they do not use it on a daily basis. Although they have incorporated it into their 
organizational framework, and used it successfully on a small scale, their peer agencies 
are not convinced they are ready to use it at a major incident. 
Although the peer agencies (police, fire, and emergency management) have 
reported significant growth in public health’s capabilities in recent years, collaboration 
obstacles remain. A disparity between their current and needed capability becomes 
apparent when examining the challenges presented by the NPS. Public health experts 
from Seattle indicated that preparing to respond to terrorism and catastrophic incidents, 
while valuable, may be distracting them from preparing for smaller-scale, more 
predictable naturally-occurring events that are judged more likely to happen. 
Seattle-King County Public Health has had mixed success in managing their 
professional relationships with traditional first responder agencies. Many factors make 
public health unique. When comparing public health with the other disciplines, 
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differences in their organizational history, culture, and doctrine emerge that highlight the 
interagency challenges they face. Their traditional consensus-based decision-making 
methodology and propensity for evaluating community health trends and effects over 
time have ill-prepared them for the new homeland security environment. The new 
environment is characterized by fast-paced decisions, often made with incomplete 
information in a heavy command and control framework. Public health’s organizational 
interpretation of how the Seattle urban area should be preparing the community differs 
from that of their peer disciplines. Gaining an understanding of these differences is 
necessary to increasing future collaboration among disciplines. 
Alarmingly, public health’s peer public safety agencies have questioned their ability 
and readiness to successfully perform as lead agency at a major health-related emergency 
incident. Public health has claimed they are ready to lead the “health portion” of a 
response, and to advise and provide medical and health-related expertise to other agencies. 
The specific role and duties associated with the title “lead agency” have not been clarified. 
Alternately, public health has questioned the other disciplines (police and fire) and their 
willingness to include them in a meaningful way at unified command events. 
Public health has demonstrated a legitimate need for additional funding to support 
their homeland security preparedness efforts. There is a specific need related to developing 
“interagency training and exercising” as a new line of business. Their current business 
model is not conducive to developing and maintaining productive interagency relationships 
because of the “fee for service” structure. A new model, supported by new funding, is 
necessary to produce collaborative growth that will allow them to meet the performance 
levels required by the NPS. The CRS also determined that nationally, we should commit 
more funding to bolster public health response capabilities. CRS found that: 
Increasing funding to the public health system, in order to provide greater 
hospital capacity, trained medical and mental health personnel, increased 
screening and surveillance, and sufficient equipment in the case of a 
chemical, biological, or toxin terrorist attack is necessary. Spending on the 
order of $10 to $30 billion per year would provide sufficient depth of 
response to reduce a chemical, biological, or toxin attack’s effectiveness.87 
 
87  Dana A. Shea, Terrorism: Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and Options 
for Lessening Their Impact (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), 10. 
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The Seattle area should direct future public health preparedness efforts towards 
the following six objectives: 
• Public health should develop an “isolation and quarantine” plan for 
distribution to the peer agencies for inclusion in their internal policy 
documents. This plan should indicate the responsibilities of each agency, 
and how they can support public health in this area. It should also include a 
mechanism for creating and issuing unified public messages. 
• Public health’s peer disciplines should work with public health personnel to 
package and deliver NIMS/ICS in training in a format that they can 
understand. Public health officials, when operating as Incident 
Commanders, should focus on policy and decision-making. Until their 
incident response experience base grows, they should be provided with a 
deputy assistant from another discipline that is well-versed in NIMS/ICS.88 
This will allow PH officials to focus on outcomes and not become 
overburdened with the mechanics of the NIMS/ICS structure. 
• Public health should re-prioritize activities or find additional funding to 
increase meaningful interagency participation related to planning, training, 
and exercising. 
• Public health should inform their peer agencies specifically how those 
agencies can support them in meeting the medical surge challenge. 
• Peer agencies should each provide a dedicated liaison or point of contact 
that public health can use for all interagency issues. 
• Peer agencies should conduct “awareness level training” on public health’s 
and the other agencies’ skill-sets and how those skills support incident 
management when health has the lead role. 
 
Since 9/11, the initial focus on equipment and supply purchases as a remedy for 
lackluster emergency preparedness has not benefited public health as much as it has 
traditional “first tier” responders. A re-examination of spending priorities is necessary to 
determine how altering fund allocation could support public health’s efforts to develop 
skills and capabilities for managing health-related catastrophic terror incidents. A federal 
health expert described the frustration felt by public health agencies during the initial 
rounds of fund allocation: 
 
88 Delphi panel member Barb Graff also pointed out that during the massive planning undertaken for 
the 1994 World Cup soccer tournament organizers specifically appointed a new “ICS advisor” staff 
position to the command staff for the purpose of helping the organizing committee (of thousands) use the 
ICS to its highest potential. 
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Initially, the goal has been to reach into the pot, grab the money, and walk 
away from the table without collaboration. This had led to a duplication of 
effort and equipment purchases. Everybody wanted the special response 
vehicles, equipped with all the bells and whistles.89 
Encouraging meaningful participation by public health in Seattle area multi-
agency exercises is vitally important to increasing overall preparedness in the urban area. 
Shugarman echoed these concerns in her findings: “Participation by public health in 
preparedness exercises is critical to achieving the long-term goal of mitigating the 
morbidity, mortality, psychosocial stress, and social consequences of a terrorist attack or 
other public health emergency.”90 
 
89 Czarnecki, Homeland Security Executive Education Seminar, 3. 
90  Lisa R. Shugarman et al., Enhancing Public Health Preparedness: Exercises, Exemplary Practices, 
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IV. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVES 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine homeland security collaboration from 
the perspective of the emergency management discipline. Emergency management is a 
relatively new field that supports and coordinates other emergency response activities 
and, as such, emergency managers might be located within police or fire departments or 
in a separate agency. Emergency Management Agencies (EMA) are organizations, both 
local and state, directed to coordinate the reduction and mitigation of the loss of life and 
property due to disasters and emergencies, and to protect critical infrastructure from all 
types of hazards through a comprehensive, risk-based, emergency management program 
of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.91 Emergency managers are best 
viewed as coordinators of emergency services engaged in prevention, mitigation, 
response, preparedness, and recovery. 
Seattle’s Director of Emergency Management, Barb Graff, explained that public 
expectations regarding emergency services remain constant while the load placed on 
public safety agencies fluctuates according to demand. A lack of available first 
responders or associated resources is usually the factor that makes any particular event a 
“disaster” for citizens.92 Emergency management’s job is to prevent “disasters” by 
coordinating resources, supporting first responders, and providing logistical assistance to 
other response agencies. The public has clearly and repeatedly reaffirmed through 
feedback to government officials that public safety is their top priority, regardless of 
economic conditions. Despite serving a critical function, emergency management 
agencies face challenges in providing more comprehensive services with fewer staff. 
Local and state budgets have decreased while performance expectations have been 
maintained or increased. These challenges have impacted emergency management 
organizations’ ability to effectively collaborate with other related agencies. 
The remainder of this chapter examines the emergency management discipline in 
the Seattle area. The chapter discusses historical perspectives, current conflicts about 
 
91 Pelfrey, “Appendix,” 1-2. 
92 Seattle Director of Emergency Management, Barb Graff, Seattle Police Department, in discussion 
with the author, August 2005. 
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federal guidance, and recommendations for the future improvement of emergency 
management. The chapter finds that the emergency management system in the Seattle 
area is particularly robust.93 Its strength stems from an early voluntary commitment to 
regional cooperation among jurisdictions and levels of government. Also, the emergency 
management function is increasingly supported by higher levels of government.94 The 
chapter also identifies one significant area of concern. The recent overriding focus on 
terrorism, mandated by the federal government, may be benefiting the region’s homeland 
security preparedness at the expense of more traditional “all-hazards” planning.95 
 
A. EMERGENCY MANAGEMEMENT’S HOMELAND SECURITY ROLE 
In a national query of homeland security professionals conducted by the author on 
a DHS computer network, respondents identified emergency management agencies most 
closely with the following activities: coordination and planning, ICS training and 
adoption, preparedness activities, requesting help from other jurisdictions and levels of 
government, public information and communications, conducting training and exercises, 
and supporting other responders.96 
The location of the emergency management function in government structures 
varies by jurisdiction in the Seattle area. The City of Seattle’s Director of Emergency 
Management, Barb Graff, explained that if a program is well-managed and supported by 
the community, it can exist anywhere. In the City of Seattle, the emergency management 
function is contained within the SPD. Chief Vickery from the SFD stated that “in Seattle, 
the EM function is perceived as police-centric due to its location in the SPD 
organizational structure. It should be located in the mayor’s office.” In King County, a 
 
93  Steven D. Stehr, Homeland Security in the State of Washington: A Baseline Report on the Activities 
of State and Local Governments (New York, NY: The Century Foundation, 2003), 26. 
94  Elizabeth B. Bazan, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act: Legal 
Requirements for Federal and State Roles in Declarations of an Emergency or Major Disaster 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 14. 
95 Under “all-hazards” planning, response and preparedness needs common to all disasters are 
developed, regardless of the cause of the disaster. 
96 Online survey conducted August 1 - September 15, 2005 by the author. Survey respondents are 
participants in the Office for Domestic Preparedness Secure Portal Website, https://odp.esportals.com. 
Approximately sixty homeland security professionals representing thirty states and four disciplines 
responded. (accessed August 1, 2005) 
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larger and more regional organization, emergency management exists as its own 
department. In other Seattle-area cities, the emergency management function is located in 
public works, public safety, and planning departments. In Washington state government, 
emergency management function is located in the Military Department. 
 
1. Emergency Management’s Perception of Their Homeland Security 
Role 
Emergency managers from the Seattle area explained their homeland security role 
includes prevention, mitigation, and ancillary support activities. These activities include 
coordinating responses among varying agencies and post-event short and long term 
recovery. Emergency managers described their primary homeland security mission as 
supporting Incident Command (IC) at the local level. This supportive and coordinating 
process is reflected by increasingly higher levels of government when necessary. By 
mitigating the effects of known hazards and, therefore, lessening their impacts, they 
actively prevent unnecessary damage. They also respond, but unlike police officers and 
firefighters, when an incident occurs they typically respond to an EOC. EOCs are secure 
facilities, usually housing representatives from each department with a response role.97 
Emergency managers perform coordination and ancillary support duties at the EOC. 
It is instructive to view the emergency management discipline as the hub of a 
multi-spoked wheel to best understand its function. The spokes of the wheel, extending 
out from the hub, represent organizational connections between emergency management 
and other entities with whom they coordinate and communicate. Figure 1 shows the 
relationship between emergency management organizations and those they support. 
 
97 Emergency Operation Centers (EOC) are secure, meaning that they are provided with physical site 










                                                
 
 
Figure 1. Emergency Management Organizational Relationships. 
 
Emergency management agencies thrive on organizational interdependencies 
created by homeland security preparation and planning activities.98 In addition to police, 
fire, and public health departments, the spokes also represent connections to the public 
sector, elected officials, school systems, and neighborhood groups. As emergency 
management organizations become increasingly effective, more spokes representing new 
relationships will appear on the wheel. 
When local governments activate their EOCs, both King County and the State of 
Washington activate their own, “leaning forward, preparing to engage.” Their activation 
signifies their readiness to help. Local emergency managers quickly clarified this point 
by indicating that command, control, and incident management responsibilities always 
rest with local entities. Any activity by a higher level of government (County, State, and 
 
98 John R. Schermerhorn, “Determinants of Interorganizational Cooperation,” The Academy of 
















                                                
Federal) is supportive of the local government entity.99 Washington, as a “home rule” 
state, allows for the continuous local control of local resources. A fire incident in 
Washington state always belongs to the fire department; crime always belongs to the 
police department, etc. 
 
2. Perceptions of the Emergency Management Role 
Emergency managers are viewed by their peers as generalists, supporting first 
response and recovery operations by connecting resources and services with needs. 
Interestingly, SMEs representing multiple disciplines agreed that “emergency management” 
should be renamed “emergency coordination.” King County, Washington calls their center an 
Emergency Coordination Center (ECC), while the City of Seattle and the State of 
Washington call theirs EOCs. Naming varies similarly across the state and country.100 
Emergency management’s (EM) peer homeland security disciplines in the Seattle 
area described the EM role much as emergency managers described it themselves. The 
other disciplines confirmed EMAs are responsible for support, coordination, and 
facilitation activities. Interestingly, they reported one significant difference. Both police 
and fire disciplines cautioned that emergency management should remain focused on 
supporting incidents, and not mistakenly drift into commanding them. They clearly stated 
that emergency management’s appropriate role is incident support, not incident 
management or command. They also noted that emergency managers are most effective 
when supporting and coordinating others’ activities. 
During EOC activations, emergency managers operate at EOCs where the 
emergency support functions are located, where information is synthesized, and where 
resources are distributed. Emergency managers can make important things happen for 
Incident Commanders. The temptation facing emergency managers, making decisions for 
Incident Commanders, instead of supporting the decisions they make, is inevitable. 
Consider the relationship between a coach and a quarterback at a football game. One 
 
99  JayEtta Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure, Homeland Security - Intergovernmental 
Coordination and Partnership Will Be Critical to Success (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2002), 14. 
100 Glen Woodbury, former Washington State Emergency Manager, in discussion with the author, 
December 2005. 
60 
                                                
manages the team on the field, while the other provides support and coordination from 
the sidelines. The key to their mutual success is agreement and understanding about 
appropriate roles and functions. 
Both the police and fire disciplines offered criticism of emergency management in 
this area. They found that keeping emergency management contained to a supportive role 
has been challenging. A police expert thought it was important that emergency 
management not “move in a direction of usurping the prerogatives of command.” A fire 
service expert commented that: 
Emergency management sometimes fails to understand their role. They 
tend to think along the lines of incident management, when in fact they 
should be incident support. Sometimes they tend to get over-involved. 
They should concentrate on their support, logistical, and coordination 
functions more. Sometimes their role wanders. Emergency management 
has an important policy and decision-making role. If the fire and utilities 
departments each needed ten front-loaders, but only 15 were available, 
emergency management would decide where the priority existed in the 
City. They dole out the resources accordingly. This activity promotes the 
best use of scarce resources, and reduces duplication of effort. 
The perceptions expressed by police and fire representatives, that EM sometimes 
“drifts into command”, instead of supporting and coordinating incidents, can be 
explained by the tendency that elected officials have to look to the EOC for leadership 
and information during significant emergencies. Therefore, emergency managers become 
impacted by higher levels of supervision, getting “pushed” to act from above. 
Emergency management’s peer disciplines view them primarily as supervisors of 
the EOC function and as the “guardians” of preparedness and response plans. A fire 
service SME described emergency management in Seattle as the “mayor’s 
representative” in the emergency process, although their chain of command follows SPD 
rank structure: 
Their function highlights the value of having all the Emergency Support 
Functions (ESFs) co-located.101 Together, an inventory of each specialty is 
available, which results in high levels of situational awareness for the 
mayor and the policy makers to use when making overall policy decisions. 
 
101 See http://www.fema.gov/about/esf.shtm for a more complete description of the emergency support 
functions. (accessed November 16, 2005), 1. 
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Emergency management has the strategic advantage of interacting with all city 
departments, neighboring jurisdictions, and levels of government. This allows them to 
visualize how the response “puzzle pieces” best fit together.102 Although other disciplines 
also interact with other agencies, this process is centralized through the emergency 
management function.103 EM’s peer disciplines also described emergency managers as 
information management experts, providers of logistical support, and as coordinators of 
government functions and services. Emergency managers were also described by their 
peers as “gatekeepers” to the National Guard and other levels of government. One 
emergency manager expressed discomfort with the term “gatekeeper” because it sounded 
too restrictive. 
A public health expert described the role of emergency management as ensuring 
that first and second tier responders work together effectively. He viewed emergency 
managers as facilitators responsible for orchestrating the overall response. He also 
observed that emergency management is a relatively new field compared with the other 
disciplines.104 Kirschenbaum echoed his observation. He found that: 
Disaster management organizations are a relatively new form of public 
sector human organization, and only after World War II did these 
organizations take hold in the public sector. As pressure from consumers 
for better public services, fiscal concerns, and the threat of terror increase, 
there is likely to be greater demand on disaster management agencies to 
improve their effectiveness.105 
Most organizations concurred that the most appropriate role for EM is support and 
coordination. Only the police and fire disciplines in the Seattle area reported some 
difficulty keeping EM contained to the support and coordination role. This frustration 
was best explained by Chief Hepburn from the SFD. He stated that “we have to make 
sure we are doing our jobs and adequately managing incidents. If we don’t, and voids are 
 
102  Harold G. Campbell, “Logic Models in Support of Homeland Security Strategy Development,” 
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2, no. 2 (2005): 2-7. 
103 Public health, for example, interacts with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
Police and fire organizations also communicate on state, regional, and national levels. The coordination 
function, however, is centralized through the EM function. 
104 James Henriksen, Seattle King County Public Health, in discussion with the author, August, 2005. 
105  Alan Kirschenbaum, “Measuring the Effectiveness of Disaster Management Organizations,” 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 22, no. 1 (2004): 75-76. 
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created, someone will surely step in and try to do our job for us.” The author’s conclusion 
is that effective incident management is the best way for other agencies to support EM in 
their coordination role. A well-managed incident is easier for them to support. 
 
B. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT’S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
Considering the four disciplines examined in this thesis, emergency 
management’s organizational culture was the most difficult to define. As a discipline, 
emergency management thrives on networks, coordination, and organizational ties. 
Emergency managers rely on their overall knowledge of emergency plans, strategies, and 
systems. Their tradecraft is characterized by weaving response agencies together, 
matching agency needs with capabilities.106 The Seattle area has benefited from an 
emergency management culture of regional cooperation, extending back many years. 
Specifically, EMAs in the Seattle area coordinated with each other before they 
were required by federal guidance to do so. This voluntary commitment to regional 
cooperation benefited the Seattle area homeland security system through better 
integration of services, more preparedness activity, and more federal assistance coming to 
the Seattle area.107 This early and voluntary effort does not seem to have been prompted 
by a specific triggering event, but rather by foresight on the part of city, county, and state 
emergency management officials. Graff described the kinds of people drawn to the 
emergency management field: 
People who are good general managers are drawn to the field and tend to 
be successful. Thorough knowledge of the areas of impact and expertise 
covered by the jurisdiction is required. As an emergency manager, the 
more of a generalist you are, the more effective you will be. 
She continued by discussing the origins of regional collaboration in the Seattle area: 
Emergency management has no loyalties. It’s our job to collaborate with 
all entities and that is collectively what defines us. In the King County 
area, since 1998, there have been voluntary efforts to do many of the 
 
106  Keith Bea, The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC): An Overview (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 6. 
107 For example, the Seattle urban area was chosen as the first urban area to receive a Mobile Education 
Training (MET) seminar. MET seminars are designed to guide top level local officials through scenario-
based terrorism training. MET seminars are provided to jurisdictions at no cost by the federal government. 
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things that we are now mandated to do. Planning assumptions were 
shared, and that process resulted in a regional disaster plan for public and 
private organizations. The plan served as a template for collaboration long 
before there were homeland security dollars to invest in the area. 
According to a fire service expert, emergency management has had to fight hard 
to maintain their existence. Regardless of the apparent need for emergency management 
services, as evidenced by regularly occurring emergency declarations, the Seattle area has 
not suffered an abundance of major disasters. Emergency management’s constant 
struggle to justify their existence and maintain their budget may be associated with the 
“job creep” perceived by the other disciplines. 
 
C. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS 
SYSTEM 
The national preparedness system under development within DHS holds 
significant implications for the operations and priorities of homeland security officials, 
emergency managers, and first responders.108 While six basic documents comprise the 
national preparedness system, two are examined here because they identify the standard 
operating procedures that first response agencies will use and situations where they will 
be necessary: the NIMS/ICS and the NPS. 
 
1. Emergency Management and the NIMS/ICS 
The Seattle area emergency management discipline has fully embraced the 
NIMS/ICS system.109 They have incorporated it into their plans and policies. Emergency 
managers heavily rely on it to perform their duties. Seattle area emergency managers rated 
the NIMS/ICS language and concepts as “extremely useful”, describing it as “the single 
most useful response tool.” NIMS’ predecessor, the ICS, was accepted by Northwest 
emergency managers many years ago. The emergency management discipline had been a 
strong proponent of its adoption and proliferation in the Northwest. Emergency managers 
 
108  Keith Bea, The National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2005), 29. 
109  City of Seattle National Incident Management System (NIMS) Implementation Plan (Seattle, WA: 
City of Seattle, 2005). 
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were teaching the ICS to school districts, private sector corporations, transportation 
departments, and utilities long before it was mandated by NIMS. 
Emergency managers rely on the NIMS/ICS concepts for everyday activities but 
they only actually implement the system during EOC activations. This contrasts with 
firefighters who use the system daily to manage incidents. The majority of emergency 
management agencies’ routine activities are related to planning or logistics. During EOC 
activations, their use of NIMS/ICS is more classically observable, because their 
operations are reflective of incident-based ICS. Graff described how emergency 
managers use NIMS/ICS during an EOC activation: 
When we activate our EOC in Seattle, and at many EOCs, you will find 
something that is reflective of the ICS. There is someone clearly in 
charge, someone clearly gathering and analyzing information, and 
someone providing logistical support. On a daily basis, we adhere to the 
principles of management by objectives, clear communications, and 
delegation of authority. 
While the Seattle area had willingly embraced NIMS/ICS and voluntarily adopted 
it, other cities are currently being “coerced” into accepting it. Technically, NIMS/ICS 
adoption is voluntary. However, local governments that fail to adopt NIMS/ICS, formulate 
an implementation plan, and train their employees disqualify themselves from federal grant 
consideration. Emergency managers have described the “carrot and stick” approach used 
by the federal government as effective, primarily because of the financial incentives. 
Seattle area emergency managers described their experiences with the federal 
government requirements to adopt NIMS/ICS as “preaching to the choir.” Other cities, 
sized comparably to Seattle, have questioned whether the requirements impose costs that 
outweigh the funding benefits. Seattle and other cities that voluntarily met the 
requirements before the mandate are thrilled that financial resources now accompany 
NIMS/ICS. The Seattle area has largely bypassed the burdens of adoption because of 
their previous proactive efforts. The practical implication for the Seattle area is that they 
do not have to “start from scratch,” unlike other comparably sized cities. 
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Seattle area emergency managers also acknowledged that not all cities have been 
as receptive regarding NIMS/ICS adoption. Some areas are actively resisting.110 While 
discussing other regions’ reluctance, Graff was reminded of a sign posted at a Chicago 
firehouse. The sign, featured in the Hollywood movie Backdraft, read: “150 years of 
history, unimpeded by progress.” Emergency managers from the Northwest, when 
participating at national group conferences held at the National Fire Academy or the 
Emergency Management Institute, were alarmed by the attitude of those attending from 
other regions that have not accepted NIMS/ICS. 
 
2. Emergency Management and the National Planning Scenarios 
Emergency managers from the Seattle area described the NPS as realistic, useful, 
and valuable, but expressed concerns about the associated guidance and funding from the 
federal government. They described the scenarios as realistic forecasts of potential actual 
events. Seattle Emergency Management has used the scenarios for planning and training 
purposes, although not extensively. Seattle Emergency Management reported having 
used three of the 15 scenarios. Emergency management officials described the NPS as 
useful because different areas of the country can use them to provide a similar challenge. 
Whether the planning event is an IED, chemical release, or a biological event, the 
scenarios are useful because different jurisdictions from across the country can similarly 
focus on the challenges they present and can share and compare training methods, 
equipment solutions, and lessons learned. All-hazards planning activities are comparable 
to shooting at a moving target. The NPS represent a more fixed target. 
Concerns about the federal requirements that accompany the scenarios were 
described by Graff: 
The requirements to use the scenarios to qualify for money, or exercise 
support, or things like that have not been in the least bit useful because 
local emergency management agencies have had hazard vulnerability 
analysis in place for decades. Based on federal government guidance, we 




110  Keith Bea, Emergency Management Preparedness Standards: Overview and Options for Congress 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 23. 
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local governments should be spending a proportionate amount of time 
training, planning, and equipping for things that will have the biggest 
community impacts. 
In Seattle, earthquakes are going to have the biggest impact. Winter 
storms, in general, are going to happen with the most frequency. And yet, 
when in the last four years have we had one of those types of exercises? 
Those types of exercises have been eclipsed by terrorism. Currently, 
nobody is paying for natural hazard drills. The planning scenarios, in my 
mind, have squeezed out the ability of local EMAs to focus appropriately. 
The current focus on terrorism has squeezed out natural hazards. The 
intended focus is obviously on CBRNE events. 
Similar concerns have been voiced by the CRS on a national level: 
Some have questioned whether the emphasis by DHS on terrorist attacks 
indicates that the National Preparedness Goal is disproportionately 
oriented toward enemy attacks and away from the most frequently 
occurring catastrophes which are natural disasters. Some might argue that 
the terrorism focus is a shift from the “all-hazards” approach that has 
developed for years.111 
Emergency managers from the Seattle area noted that the scenarios were 
developed exclusively by federal or “federally-contracted” people.112 The apparent lack 
of state and local representation was described as “absolutely unbalanced” and reflective 
of the federal government’s focus on terrorism. An emergency management expert 
described the reversal in federal strategy regarding preparedness: 
For years, we followed the federal guidance philosophy that indicated we 
should be engaged in “all-hazards” emergency preparedness. Hazards can 
be subdivided into natural, technological, and man-made. Only one subset 
of them is terrorism-related events. Logic indicates that looking at all 
potential hazards and then committing time and resources accordingly is a 
good investment. Over the last four years, that reasoning has become 
inverted. Now the federal guidance is to focus on terrorism events, and 
that focus will provide benefits for all the other things we respond to. That 
is not the case at all. 
The scenarios are not uniformly useful by jurisdiction. The Seattle area has a large 
marine presence that is not reflected. However, in interviews, when I raised the possibility 
 
111  Bea, The National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress, 9. 
112 Chief Vickery from the SFD observed that perhaps the most important aspect of this particular issue 
is that federal agencies set the scope for what the exercises must cover, not the origin of the authors. 
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of disregarding the NPS and using locally-crafted scenarios, emergency management 
officials explained why that is neither advisable nor supported. According to Graff: 
As a defined urban area, we will not be given the latitude to decide what 
we want to do. The guidelines affiliated with being an urban area promote 
a strong focus on terrorism. To some extent, we would disqualify 
ourselves from tens of millions of dollars in federal assistance if we did 
that. We need to refocus and find an appropriate balance. 
Northwest emergency managers were questioned about the scenarios and 
collaboration among agencies. The results indicate both positive and negative features. 
The financial resources that accompanied the scenarios have enhanced collaboration. 
Agencies seeking financial support have actively participated in planning, developed 
organizational relationships, and practiced skills. The process has resulted in agencies 
becoming more collaborative at actual events. On October 15, 2005 multiple agencies 
including the Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT), the Washington State 
Department of Transportation (WSDOT), and the WSP participated in a training exercise 
with Seattle fire, police, and EM. The “hands-on” exercise simulated the explosion and 
collapse of the Alaskan Way viaduct, a major Seattle roadway. Without federal funding, 
the exercise would not have happened. This particular exercise was conducted as a result 
of a directive from Seattle Mayor Nickels. In this rare instance, first and second tier 
responders practiced together. The future challenge will be maintaining the collaborative 
relationships if the federal funding subsides. 
Emergency managers also questioned if the funding associated with the scenarios 
created collaboration, or instead, created additional competition among agencies. The 
arrival of the NPS and associated funding has prompted a discussion of where the most 
threat, risk, and vulnerability exists in the Seattle urban area. 
 
D. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT’S PERCEPTIONS OF COLLABORATION 
CHALLENGES 
The emergency management discipline is closely involved in interagency 
collaboration because of their overall coordination and support duties. The emergency 
manager’s goal is to consider all available resources and capabilities that may be 
compartmentalized by agency. Then they ascertain the best resource combination and apply 
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it to the problem. Interagency coordination is central to the emergency management 
function. The emergency manager’s job is to consider which agencies should be 
represented at a particular situation, and which agencies are missing. They seek to 
determine all possible impacts of a particular operation and get the right agencies involved. 
In the past, however, emergency managers have had to referee disputes among 
agencies. Emergency management experts were not forthcoming in describing 
collaboration barriers in the Seattle area. This suggests either that collaboration barriers 
are not a prominent part of the emergency management landscape or that the experts were 
unwilling to discuss them. Reluctantly, emergency management experts identified 
information-sharing and interagency communication as barriers to collaboration. 
The first barrier identified in the Seattle area was described as an “unwillingness to 
share information” related to intelligence.113 Graff described the criticism in greater detail: 
There are certain parts of terrorism prevention that have to do with 
intelligence analysis and that type of thing. There are some necessary 
constraints over what happens with the information. That could be a 
barrier if the right thing doesn’t happen with the information after its 
analyzed. Unless the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) shares 
information at the local level, there isn’t much that the City of Seattle can 
do by itself on certain vulnerabilities. Agencies that deal with intelligence 
on a daily basis are interested in making sure others with similar 
qualifications and backgrounds, and the appropriate “need to know,” 
participate in agency to agency sharing. 
The place for success is deciding what to do with information once you 
have gotten it. If typical intelligence gathering, analyzing, and planning 
agencies would be more willing to bring others in at the appropriate 
moment, then the criticism “shouldn’t we have been at the table in the first 
place” isn’t such a big issue. 
Despite the admission of information sharing as a collaboration barrier in the 
Seattle area, interagency communications from the July 7, 2005 London bombing were 
offered as an effective example.  Graff described Seattle’s reaction that day: 
Seattle’s Chief of Police invited the fire department leadership for an early 
morning briefing. Three hours later, a conference call with all city 
 
113 Problems associated with “unity of effort” and intelligence distributions are certainly not limited to 
the Seattle area. The 9/11 Commission devoted Chapter 13, Section 2 of their report (pages 407-419) to 
describing similar challenges on a national level. The 9/11 Commission Report, 407. 
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department heads was conducted. The police and fire departments, 
emergency management, transportation, and the public information office 
met together in the EOC. As long as those types of actions are happening, 
I’m not concerned with representation on the analysis part. If the 
appropriate outcomes are happening, that is what is important. 
Although Seattle’s reaction to the London bombing on July 7th, 2005 was 
timely, decisive, and inclusive, it hardly represented an intelligence victory. The author 
found no evidence that anything discussed in the briefing, or distributed in the 
memorandum that followed, contained any information not readily available from 
mainstream news media sources.114 
Emergency management officials also described another collaboration barrier. 
Historically, interagency communications have challenged relationships and decision-
making among departments. Graff described the problem as more prevalent in the mid-
level ranks: 
Let’s use the police and fire departments as an example. These are two 
of the most classic first response agencies. They have learned over the 
years how to collaborate at the unit level. The department chiefs are 
clearly committed and philosophically on-board. The gap exists 
somewhere in between. 
This barrier was further explained by agencies’ tendency to use a “department-
centric” view. While departments might support interagency coordination with written 
plans and policies, they seldom actively implement it to its full potential. Sometimes, 
agencies simply forget to reach out and form partnerships with the members of other 
departments. Apparently, this tendency is not unique to police and fire departments. 
 
E. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Emergency Management System in the Seattle area is robust and has 
achieved great progress in homeland security preparedness. Its strength is primarily 
attributable to an early and voluntary commitment to regional cooperation and use of the 
 
114  Lessons Learned from the London Terror Attacks of July 7, 2005 (Washington, D.C.: Department 
of Homeland Security, 2005), 1-6. 
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ICS.115 Planning assumptions shared among governments, effective interagency 
communications, and supportive and complementary emergency management 
relationships have resulted in an effective “head-start” over other regions.116 Voluntary 
adoption and use of the ICS has provided a mechanism to enhance mutual aid 
agreements. Its use at interagency exercises has also provided preparedness benefits. 
Although NIMS/ICS purists still see ample room for improvement in the 
Northwest, historical comparisons show that the early adoption and use of the system has 
provided interagency benefits for the region. A Northwest emergency manager 
commented on the importance of regional cooperation: 
On 9/11, our experiences on the west coast reflected the fact that we 
already had regional partnerships in place, and that we were concerned 
about being able to respond adequately to any type of event. There were 
many of us in first response agencies that were horrified to see how police 
and fire agencies from the same city did not cooperate. There are two 
images I can never forget. One is the image of the towers themselves 
falling, and the other is, months after, firefighters trying to work at the 
rubble pile, and getting arrested by police officers. I can’t get that out of 
my head. 
Despite emergency management’s strength in the Seattle area, there are specific 
things local public safety agencies can do to further support it. The following list contains 
recommendations for strengthening emergency management and cooperative relationships: 
• The Seattle area should create a single website where local, regional, and 
state emergency management plans and electronic resources are located.  
While several comprehensive websites and plans are available, locating and 
navigating among them is cumbersome and confusing. Providing easy 
access and a “single source” for emergency management information will 
result in “customer service” improvements. 
• The Seattle area should seek inclusion and participation, through EM 
channels, in any future effort to further develop or revise the NPS. 
• The Seattle area should develop a long range emergency management 
strategic plan inclusive of local, regional, state, and national goals and 
 
115  Kathy George, “A Moment with Eric Holdeman, Director of Emergency Management,” Seattle 
Post-Intelligencer, 2005, sec. Local News, 2. 
116 Because of early and voluntary commitments to the use of the ICS, cooperative regional planning, 
and networked relationships, EMAs in the Seattle area have an advantage compared to other urban areas. 
However, interagency collaboration challenges still exist in the Seattle urban area. 
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objectives. This plan will assist local governments and the region in 
capitalizing on future “windows of opportunity.”117 
• The Seattle area should conduct training for all homeland security 
disciplines about the emergency management function and processes. 
Currently, only a small percentage of homeland security professionals have 
been provided with the necessary training. 
• Seattle area fire service, law enforcement, public health, and utilities 
agencies should commit additional personnel and resources to the 
emergency management function. Doing so will strengthen and enhance 
regional capability by developing interagency partnerships, further each 
agency’s understanding of other agencies’ specific agency skill sets, and 
promote a more regional, team approach.118 Additionally, it will increase 
the likelihood that existing collaborative relationships will survive in the 
event that federal funding streams subside. 
Northwest emergency managers explained that classic emergency management has 
always been about all-hazards preparedness. The relatively narrow focus on terrorism, 
advocated recently by the federal government, has provided benefits to the Northwest 
region at the expense of all-hazards planning. Although terrorism and all-hazards planning 
are not mutually exclusive, emergency managers reported that the singular focus on 
terrorism had created an “unbalanced approach.” Northwest natural hazards like 
earthquakes and weather-related events have been under-represented in preparedness 
activities and drills. An alternate view, advanced by Chief Vickery from the SFD is “the 
‘all-hazards’ argument is frequently touted by EM. The truth is that if you can successfully 
respond to a terrorist incident, you can successfully respond to all hazards.” 
The conflicting guidance sent to localities by the federal government has resulted 
in confusion at the local level. Should local governments conduct all-hazards 
vulnerability analysis and then commit their resources accordingly? Or, as current federal 
guidance suggests, should they prepare for terrorism, hoping that those preparations will 
benefit their all-hazards capabilities? 
Northwest EMAs have capitalized on financial “windows of opportunity” created 
by DHS and should continue to do so. They should use the opportunities to create all-
 
117  Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2004), 29. 
118  William R. Dodge, Regional Emergency Preparedness Compacts: Safeguarding the Nation’s 
Communities (Washington, D.C.: Alliance for Regional Stewardship, 2002), 41. 
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hazards benefits wherever possible. Re-balancing priorities and paying increased 
attention to more likely occurring and higher impact events is a more logical and 
defendable approach. 
Preparedness dollars flowing into the Seattle area from federal government 
funding streams have been earmarked for specific outcomes like terrorism training, first 
responder equipment purchases, and NIMS/ICS adoption. In their haste to capitalize on 
federal grants and other financial assistance, local governments and emergency 
management agencies have learned how expensive free money becomes. The federal 
grants come with “strings attached”, namely specific performance requirements and 
deadlines. Local EMAs have been required to shift resources to manage these new 
opportunities. The physical limitations of staff time and energy and the singular focus on 
terrorism have resulted in skewed overall strategy. Emergency managers uniformly 
echoed this concern.119 The best way emergency managers can adapt to the terrorism-
heavy focus of the strategy is by including all-hazards components into training 
exercises, equipment purchases, and plans whenever possible. 
 
119  DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 9. 
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V. FIRE DEPARTMENT PERSPECTIVES 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine homeland security collaboration from 
the perspective of local, municipal fire service organizations in the Seattle area. While 
several different fire department sources were examined, those from the SFD are featured 
prominently in this chapter. The SFD is the author’s sponsoring organization.120 
This chapter also describes firefighters’ homeland security role and their 
organizational culture. It explains how fire departments have an opportunity to play a 
pivotal role in the adoption and expansion of the NIMS/ICS across homeland security 
disciplines. It continues with analysis of the NPS, the TOPOFF 2 exercise, and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial summit meeting. Recommendations for the fire 
service regarding information sharing and intelligence conclude the chapter. This 
chapter’s important conclusions are: 
• Because of SFD’s comparably long history using the ICS, they are the 
agency (and discipline) best positioned to assist their peer agencies with 
NIMS/ICS integration across the urban area. Seattle area firefighters use it 
daily. It works well for them in the terrorism-response role because it is a 
natural extension of their current activity. Hazardous materials response 
with law enforcement agencies serves as an effective example of NIMS/ICS 
interagency integration. 
• However, municipal fire departments, like Seattle’s, are inexperienced using 
NIMS/ICS in its expanded format and they struggle to adequately manage 
“large-scale” incident logistics. The WTO incident and TOPOFF 2 exercise 
illustrate this finding. Municipal fire departments are not “tuned” to dealing 
with long-term incidents. They need training to improve and can only get 
this through wildland experience. The wildland community has not allowed 
municipal firefighter’s access to the deployments necessary to get 
credentials. 
• Seattle area fire departments have not engaged terrorism prevention in a 
meaningful way as mandated by federal guidance. Seeking inclusion and 
partnership with law enforcement (LE) agencies in intelligence and 
information-sharing operations provides a possible remedy. 
 
120  “Seattle Fire Department,” in Seattle Fire Department [database online]. Seattle, WA November 
17, 2005.  Available from http://www.cityofseattle.net/fire/. (accessed December 28, 2005) The Seattle Fire 
Department is nationally recognized for its fire, Emergency Medical Service (EMS) and special operations 
response capability. Approximately 200 firefighters are on duty each day. They are assigned to 33 fire 
stations located strategically throughout the city. (Seattle Disaster Readiness and Response Plan, Volume 2, 
ESF 4 Annex, 3. 
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• Operating in “unified command” situations is not a particular problem for 
fire service agencies. Fire service interagency collaboration is effective at 
top and bottom organizational levels. It is best reinforced through periodic, 
multi-agency exercises. Exercise realism enhances overall value. Both 
effective (Olympic Pipeline incident) and ineffective (WTO event response) 
unified command examples are explored. 
 
A. DEFINING FIREFIGHTERS’ HOMELAND SECURITY ROLE 
Fire service SMEs explained that their primary homeland security role is 
providing initial fire, rescue, hazardous materials, and medical response to homeland 
security incidents and events. The fire department role descriptions provided to the author 
by fire service SMEs, their peer disciplines, and guiding policy documents matched 
closely. Fire service experts also explained that because of their consequence 
management activities, fire departments are historically and inherently reactionary. The 
homeland security role of fire service organizations is generally both clearly defined by 
policy documents and accepted by other disciplines, with one notable exception. 
Firefighters’ role in the prevention of terrorism incidents is unclear. 
Firefighters are most closely associated with the following homeland security 
activities by their peers: 
• Life safety 
• Incident stabilization 
• Implementing and using the NIMS/ICS 
• Fire suppression 
• Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 
• Hazardous materials management, to include mass decontamination and 
rapid agent detection 
• Search and rescue 
• Property conservation 
The Seattle Disaster Readiness and Response Plan designates the SFD as the lead 
agency for major fires, hazardous materials incidents, air crashes, floods, structural 
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collapses, and earthquakes. The SPD is designated as the lead agency for terrorism.121 
The City of Seattle’s designation of LE as the lead agency for terrorism events is consistent 
with federal guidance. The plan’s annex (appendix) also includes the fire department’s 
specific responsibilities. They are similar to the above-listed duties, which suggest that 
firefighters are performing the kinds of duties expected of them by their peers. 
Interestingly, firefighters’ homeland security role differs little from their daily 
role. In either case, they are engaged in similar physical activities, such as fire 
suppression, rescue, or medical aid work. This contrasts with the other disciplines, 
especially public health officials, whose daily role in the community is quite different 
from their homeland security role. Chief Tim Kimsey, from the Port of Seattle Police 
Department (POSPD), explained that firefighters also have an important role in planning, 
preparing, and coordinating their efforts with other public safety entities. James 
Henriksen from Seattle King County Public Health described his perception of the fire 
service homeland security role: 
Fire departments provide the initial response to the acute incident. They 
are first at the site, and responsible for life safety and rescue. They provide 
an initial assessment of what has happened and they provide the 
parameters. Framing what has happened is important for public health to 
prepare their response. 
While fire departments’ terrorism response role is clear, their role in the 
prevention of terrorism incidents is ambiguous. Arguably, the fire service is currently 
engaged in prevention through pre-fire planning, fire and life safety code enforcement, 
and general occupancy safety programs. The degree to which these kinds of traditional 
fire prevention activities appreciably impact terrorism prevention is unclear. The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security lists terrorism prevention as the primary objective for all 
first responders.122 The ODP Prevention and Deterrence Guidelines exist as a template 
 
121  Seattle Disaster Readiness & Response Plan (Seattle, WA: Seattle Police Department, 2003), 56. 
The Seattle Disaster Readiness and Response Plan lists the following specific responsibilities for the Seattle 
Fire Department: suppression of structural fires, marine vessel and related facility fires, and chemical and 
brush fires, fire protection, high angle, confined space, and heavy rescues, hazardous materials releases, 
mass casualty incidents, terrorist attacks with Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) weapons, and 
emergency medical triage, treatment, and transport. During recovery operations this may include support 
for fire investigations, decontamination of personnel and equipment. 
122  National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002), 2. 
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that first response agencies should use to engage in prevention.123 Yet, fire service SMEs 
reported that fire departments have a minimal role in terrorism prevention. This 
perception was validated locally and nationally.124 
Terrorism prevention is a new and unfamiliar concept for the fire service. 
Terrorism prevention metrics are lacking, and it has not been a funded activity.125 Besides 
the DHS, no government entities have actively encouraged or required fire departments 
to engage in terrorism prevention activity. 
The case for terrorism prevention has been poorly received by the fire service. 
The logic supporting the argument is that if all terror attacks were preventable then fire 
department response would be unnecessary. This is precisely the same logic fire 
departments use to support their traditional fire prevention activities. Yet, when this 
argument was applied to terrorism prevention, it was rejected by firefighters. Fire service 
leaders explained that the case for prevention negatively impacts their true mission which 
is incident response and consequence management. Arguably, preventing all attacks, a 
wholly worthwhile goal, is impossible. Therefore, firefighters explained, “we had better 
be prepared to respond.” Another fire service SME, when questioned about the fire 
department’s role in prevention said, “If we were involved in prevention, we probably 
wouldn’t want to advertise it. The fire department doesn’t have a big role.” Currently, 
Seattle area fire departments have made a hollow commitment, at best, towards terrorism 
prevention. Prevention goals and objectives exist in plans, but have not been 
implemented in practice. Seattle area municipal fire departments have yet to discover a 
realistic way to engage in terrorism prevention. 
Firefighters’ general homeland security role can be further examined by 
comparing it with the LE discipline. The homeland security roles of police and fire 
departments have converged at the edge of the hot zone. This is primarily because police 
 
123  The Office for Domestic Preparedness Guidelines for Homeland Security: Prevention and 
Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003), 4. 
124 Online survey conducted August 1- September 15, 2005 by the author. Survey respondents are 
participants in the Office for Domestic Preparedness Secure Portal Website, https://odp.esportals.com. 
Approximately sixty homeland security professionals representing thirty states and four disciplines 
responded. (accessed August 1, 2005) 
125  Glen Woodbury, “Measuring Prevention,” Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 1 (2005), 4. 
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officers have had to adapt to performing their duties in hazardous atmospheres. Although 
each discipline has distinctly different responsibilities, the necessity to perform 
supportive functions in hazardous atmospheres has clouded the distinction between the 
two. Role crossover occurs when one agency supports the other. Firefighters, for 
example, need scene security provided for them while they extract patients. Police bomb 
technicians need to be decontaminated after they exit hazardous areas. Assistant Chief 
Bill Hepburn from the SFD explained how this interdependency has impacted the two 
disciplines’ roles: 
We need to further clarify what our homeland security roles are for 
terrorism response. Doing so will make it easier to find gaps and support 
each other. Is the SPD prepared to work in a hazardous atmosphere? They 
are farther ahead than most police agencies. Their bomb guys and Special 
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) guys are prepared. They have units that 
would work well in a hazardous atmosphere. We have to support law 
enforcement in their duties. We have a role in supporting them with air 
monitoring and decontamination. We need to better understand their needs 
in order to support them. We haven’t done that in the past. 
How do we decide which agency should lead? That is why we need to 
pound on the unified command concept. We need unified command to 
help us make those distinctions. Fire and police each have a distinct role. 
There is some crossover in support. The roles should run concurrently. 
Having both the police and fire departments at the command post 
organizing each other’s activities is critical. 
 
B. DEFINING THE FIRE SERVICE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
Firefighters, as a general rule, enjoy solving problems aggressively. Whether the 
request for help is a fire, rescue, or medical aid emergency, they are eager to put their 
skills to work. Each new alarm presents a new opportunity. Typically, firefighters are 
received warmly and trusted by the public. Firefighters hold the public’s trust in the 
highest regard. Fire departments are tradition-oriented and firefighters are change-
resistant. A prevalent distrust of the non-familiar abounds. Also, firefighters have a 
tendency to view themselves as the owners and keepers of the ICS. Collectively, they are 
heavily team-oriented. This orientation creates a stigmatizing effect on “freelancing” 
activities at incident scenes.126  
 
126 Templeton, “Assessing the Utility of Work Team Theory,” 30. 
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Assistant Chief Hepburn from the SFD described firefighters’ affinity for 
engaging their tasks and their tendency towards overzealousness: 
We tend to “laser in” on our job. We do okay with other agencies, but we 
tend to want to do too much. Let’s use a fatality car accident as an 
example. Our primary job is to extricate and care for the patients. There 
will be a firefighter there that wants to take all the debris and blood and 
wash it away, not realizing that it is important evidence, needed by the 
police for the accident investigation. We need to do a better job of 
recognizing that there are other agencies that can come and help us out. 
Firefighters’ peer agencies described fire department culture slightly differently. 
SMEs from Seattle King County Public Health described the fire service culture as 
orderly and consistent, hierarchical, and focused on command and control. They 
described firefighters’ work as specific and defined and observed that firefighters are 
highly trained to mitigate specific hazards. The LE SMEs described firefighters as highly 
respected and trustworthy. They characterized firefighters as those first responders that 
engage in life safety and rescue activity. They also described firefighters as the “resident 
experts” on the ICS. 
Contrasting the fire and police cultures helps highlight interesting differences 
between them and provides clues for improving their future interactions. Unlike 
firefighters, police officers are not always welcomed by the public; neither do they 
always have their trust. Police officers typically work solo and are self reliant for street 
survival. These cultural differences can create incident management implications. For 
example, eight firefighters working at one incident scene will likely be sharing one 
operational plan, conversely, eight police officers working at the same scene may be 
utilizing up to eight different operational plans.127 
Chief Hepburn related a story he heard from an experienced Public Safety Civil 
Service employee who had conducted promotional exams for both the Seattle Police and Fire 
Departments for many years which highlights another nuance between the two cultures: 
Before a fire department lieutenants’ exam, the firefighter candidates wait 
solemnly in the lobby. They enter the testing room single file when 
instructed and sit with a desk spaced between them. They don’t touch the 
test booklets sitting on the desks in front of them because they are 
 
127 Sergeant Deanna Nolette, Seattle Police Department, in discussion with the author, November 2005. 
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instructed not to. By comparison, a police department sergeants’ exam is a 
completely different atmosphere. The police candidates wander all over 
the place, they sit wherever they want to, and they fidget with the test 
booklets, tapping their pencils. Police officers and firefighters have 
different mindsets and outlooks and they exhibit different behaviors. The 
illustration of differences in behavior between firefighters and police 
officers is not negative, but merely an observation of the differing 
mindsets needed for these jobs. 
 
C. FIRE SERVICE PERCEPTIONS OF NIMS/ICS 
Seattle area fire departments have integrated NIMS/ICS into their policies, 
procedures, and plans. Firefighters described NIMS/ICS as an essential tool for managing 
incidents. Seattle area firefighters rely on NIMS/ICS exclusively to resolve daily 
emergencies. The fire service leadership described NIMS/ICS as useful, effective, and 
necessary. Although fire departments reported a long history of extensive internal ICS 
usage, challenges using it with other disciplines remain. Using NIMS/ICS in its expanded 
form and using it cooperatively with other agencies in the unified command setting has 
proven challenging.128 Firefighter’s daily use of the system tends to be routine and 
repetitive. The distinction between the system’s routine and expanded use is important. 
Future catastrophic terrorism response will necessitate the system’s expanded use by 
multiple agencies, disciplines, and levels of government. 
Chief Hepburn explained why municipal fire departments should practice using 
NIMS/ICS in its expanded format: 
Using NIMS/ICS is our core competency. We know it inside and out. 
What we need to learn is how to expand it. Fire Departments tend to be 
incident specific. We suffer from a “room fire mentality” in that regard. 
The Othello, Washington fire department, for example, knows how to “fill 
in all the boxes” of the ICS better than we do in Seattle because of their 
wildland firefighting experience. Municipal fire departments are typically 
not good at expanding the ICS to its full potential. When we get into 
multi-operational periods, we fall flat. We don’t do logistics well, because 
often times we don’t need to. Requesting a Metro bus to shelter victims is 
not logistics. Most of the time that is all we need for a successful incident 
outcome. 
 
128  Lt John Kane, The Incident Command System and the Concept of Unified Command at a Terrorist 
Incident (Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute, 2005), 2. 
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Representatives from multiple disciplines explained that Seattle lives in a “charmed 
world” in terms of NIMS/ICS acceptance. The west coast has an advantage over other 
regions of the country regarding NIMS/ICS implementation. Because of their long history 
of wildfire interagency cooperation, west coast departments have more experience using 
the system. DHS Secretary Chertoff recently described firefighters’ role in the development 
of the system as critical.129 Yet, even in California, where Firescope and ICS originated, it 
has taken fire departments twenty years to fully embrace the concept.130 
Currently, Seattle area fire departments are practicing unified command with their 
homeland security agency partners by periodically drilling, exercising, and participating 
at actual events. They have experienced both successes and failures as one element of a 
multi-part response system. Chief Hepburn explained the importance of continued 
training, practicing, and experience gathering: 
Unified command is working. It is used successfully every summer in this 
country. Wildland firefighting organizations are using it effectively in the 
federal realm. Local, state, and federal agencies, including the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM), are using it to manage incidents with up to two 
thousand people lasting two or three weeks. The wildfire model is a 
proven success. Municipal fire departments don’t have to reinvent the 
wheel. We really don’t have to think up anything new, we just need to 
follow their example. 
City of Seattle Director of Emergency Management, Barb Graff, offered the 1999 
Olympic Pipeline explosion incident as a successful example of unified command at the 
municipal level.131 Four agencies combined and formed a unified command in Whatcom 
County, Washington to manage a major pipeline rupture and subsequent explosion. The 
Bellingham, Washington Fire Department (BFD), the Whatcom County Office of 
Emergency Management (OEM), the Washington State DOE, and the Olympic Pipeline 
 
129  Remarks by Secretary Chertoff at the International Association of Fire Chiefs Leadership Summit, 
Washington, D.C. (Washington, D.C.: International Association of Fire Chiefs, 2005), 5-6. 
130  “Firescope,” in California State Fire Service [database online]. Los Angeles, CA Sept 14, 2005.  
Available from http://www.firescope.org. (accessed September 12, 2005) FIRESCOPE was organized after 
the disastrous 1970 wildland fires in southern California. The goal of this group was to create and 
implement new applications in fire service management, technology and coordination, with an emphasis on 
incident command and multi-agency coordination. This dynamic statewide program continues to serve the 
needs of the California fire service today. 
131  For a detailed account of the Olympic Pipeline Explosion, see the complete accident report 
compiled by the National Transportation Safety Board. Pipeline Rupture and Subsequent Fire in 
Bellingham, Washington June 10, 1999 (Washington, D.C.: National Transportation Safety Board, 2002). 
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Company© formed a unified command team and successfully managed a regionally 
significant incident with life safety, fire, and environmental hazards. The unified 
command team shifted the leadership role among themselves when necessary, and 
completed their prioritized incident objectives accordingly. Rescue, fire suppression, 
incident stabilization, and property conservation objectives were addressed successively. 
Seattle’s annual “Seafair” public celebration also serves as a repeatedly successful 
example of unified command execution in the urban environment. 
Unified command is not always easy, successful, or achievable. The City of Seattle 
Fire and Police Departments attempted to establish a unified command to manage the city’s 
July 4, 2005 public celebration. The event consisted of multiple venues, several hundred 
thousand spectators and spanned eight hours. The SPD established a command post at their 
Seattle Police Operations Center (SPOC) and not at the incident site. The SPOC is a secure 
police facility and its choice as a command post location effectively pre-empted the unified 
participation of other agencies. SPD did invite and accepted a SFD liaison inside, but not 
their command-level representative. The July 4th example highlights a fundamental 
disagreement about NIMS/ICS that has hampered interagency progress. 
Typically in an emergency, the most pressing needs readily lend themselves to the 
leadership of a particular agency, but not always. Consider a simultaneous hazardous 
materials release, an active fire, and a bomb threat combined at one incident scene. 
Which public safety agency should lead? Is the SFD hazardous material team (Unit 77) or 
the SPD bomb squad more immediately necessary? The unified command concept should 
be routinely used for deciding these types of issues. Chief Hepburn described how the 
unified command team structure can assist public safety officials with decision-making 
during ambiguous situations: 
We should look to the unified command team to decide these issues. The 
appropriate question is “how can the unified command team handle this”, 
not, “how can my agency handle this?” The only benefit that lead agency 
status gets you is the ability to name the Operations Section Chief. In a 
unified command setting, you shouldn’t think in terms of who is in charge, 
you should think it terms of how the team can work together to mitigate 
the situation. It has to be a collaborative effort. The authority and 
responsibility is spread out across a team of people. If the unified 
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command team finds it advantageous to do so, they can name one person 
to lead, and then support that designated leader. 
 
D. FIRE SERVICE PERCEPTIONS OF THE NATIONAL PLANNING 
SCENARIOS 
Fire service SMEs described the NPS as realistic and useful tools, but also 
explained that, because they are new, they have not been used extensively. At the time of 
this writing, the City of Seattle had collectively exercised three of the fifteen scenarios. 
The degree of interest and usage was consistent across disciplines. Fire service leaders 
explained that although they found limited value in using the scenarios as templates, they 
were more interested in creating their own Seattle-specific scenarios. The SFD has an 
extensive history with scenario-based training including the TOPOFF 2 exercise, the 
Marine Terrorism Response (MTR) series, and drills with the University of Washington 
and other organizations. Fire department officials explained their plans to continue using 
scenario-based training, but pointed out that the NPS were not readily adaptable to their 
specific needs. Chief Hepburn personally felt that concentrating on WMD incidents 
exclusively was a mistake because of their low likelihood of occurrence. Instead, he 
thought that focusing on locally-developed scenarios was a more effective plan: 
Let’s get better at the things we will most likely do and our command 
support skills will grow. We haven’t used the NPS extensively yet. 
Realistically, we will probably do our own planning and training and then 
look backwards and see if we hit them. I don’t see the NPS driving 
interagency collaboration. They certainly haven’t been advertised as the 
“bible for how to prepare.” 
 
E. THE FIRE SERVICE AND HOMELAND SECURITY COLLABORATION 
The Seattle Disaster Readiness and Response Plan hints at the degree of 
interagency cooperation necessary to manage a major terrorism event but it fails to stress 
the importance of city agencies working together to produce a successful outcome. The 
plan states that “a Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical (NBC) incident will be an 
overwhelming event, challenging the resources of the city. Virtually all city agencies will 
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be involved. Fire, police, health, utilities, educational, communications, and a host of 
other disciplines will be employed to address the event.”132 
Chief A.D. Vickery from the SFD reported that real events, rather than 
agreements or plans, have enhanced interagency collaboration in the Seattle area. The 
most useful training and exercise programs have been those that have required the active 
investment and participation of multiple agencies, including the MTR and Metro Medical 
Response Team (MMRS) projects.133,134 
SFD officials described their linkage with LE as most successful because of 
interagency familiarity and a lengthy history of common daily interaction. Alternately, 
they described their linkage with public health as more challenging because of a lack of 
shared work history and interagency familiarity. They also described two processes that 
had enhanced interagency collaboration. 
The City of Seattle’s formal NIMS/ICS adoption process and the Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) funding program were listed as processes that supported 
collaboration.135 Seattle Mayor Greg Nickel’s June, 2005 executive order, formally 
adopting NIMS/ICS in Seattle, was welcomed by the SFD.136 Fire service SMEs expressed 
hope that the mayor’s support of NIMS/ICS would hasten the system’s adoption and use in 
the Seattle area. Because of their history and experience with ICS, fire departments should 
take a leadership role in expanding the system’s use by other disciplines. UASI funding has 
also enhanced collaboration, particularly with the police department. Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) worn and used in hazardous situations by members of both departments 
has required them to train together and to provide support for each other. Because fire 
 
132  Seattle Disaster Readiness & Response Plan, 216. 
133  “Port of Seattle Marine Terrorism Response Project Web Site,” in Port of Seattle [database online]. 
Seattle, WA November 17, 2005.  Available from http://www.marineresponse.org. (accessed July 10, 
2005), 1. 
134  “Metropolitan Medical Response System,” in Department of Homeland Security [database online]. 
Washington, D.C. August 10, 2005.  Available from http://www.mmrs.fema.gov/Main/Success.aspx. 
(accessed September 14, 2005), 1. 
135  “Securing our Homeland: Protecting Our Urban Areas,” in Department of Homeland Security 
[database online]. Washington, D.C. August 10, 2005. Available from 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4097. (Accessed November 7, 2005), 1. 
136  Gregory J. Nickels, Executive Order: 02-05 National Incident Management System, City of Seattle, 
Office of the Mayor, (Seattle, WA: City of Seattle, 2005), 1. 
84 
departments already have air monitoring, decontamination, and hazardous materials 
infrastructure and systems in place, they also have an opportunity to assist law enforcement 
as they expand their capabilities in these areas. 
Fire service leaders were questioned about where in their organizations (at what 
organizational levels) collaboration was necessary, unnecessary, and effective. They 
reported that connectivity between departments and interagency cooperation was strong 
and effective at top organizational levels. Connectivity at the top organizational level 
includes: EOC activity, the monthly Disaster Management Committee (DMC) meetings, 
and frequent informal meetings between public safety executives. They were not 
concerned about fostering collaboration at the unit level. Chief Hepburn explained why: 
Collaboration is occurring at task level, but that is not where it is needed 
most. Firefighters never turn down help. They will collaborate with 
anyone that will help them do their jobs. The coordination problems will 
occur at management level. Having a public health nurse ride around on a 
fire truck is not going to help; because the fire truck is not going to be her 
issue. Her issue is going to be the fire battalion chief who will be trying to 
organize the overall effort. 
The fire service experts were also questioned about the necessity of collocating 
with other disciplines and conducting joint operations. They judged the concepts 
unnecessary. Notably, all four disciplines examined, in this thesis, offered similar 
analysis. The author had originally and incorrectly assumed that the disciplines would 
agree that by increasing contact among agencies at more organizational levels enhanced 
collaboration would result. The suggestion and recommendation were soundly rejected. A 
need for daily and formal integration of the homeland security disciplines in the Seattle 
area was not validated. Instead, each discipline reported that practicing and cooperating 
around periodic multi-agency exercises was more effective and was a better investment 
of their time and money. 
An alternate and minority position, advocated by the FD and EM disciplines 
supports the perceived value of collocation. Graff stated: 
Personally, I’m a big fan of limited term internships among disciplines. 
Have a fire captain, police captain, emergency planner, and public health 
outreach specialist each spend two months in another’s domain - and they  
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will bring home to their agencies a greater understanding and empathy for 
what will be necessary in the unified command structure on the day of the 
event. 
Chief Vickery from the SFD described a limitation of focusing solely on 
collaboration at periodic exercises: 
I disagree that collocation is “unnecessary.” Working together and 
understanding our common problems and the different challenges facing 
other disciplines is a key element of success We absolutely need to 
collaborate, collocate, and work together on a daily basis. It is about 
relationships - and you cannot develop these at periodic multi-agency drills. 
Not surprisingly, multi-agency exercises are a cornerstone of the National 
Preparedness System.137 A fire service SME explained why the concept of “joint-ness” 
has worked well for the military but is perhaps unnecessary in this situation. Several 
military service branches routinely perform similar tasks. For example, multiple service 
branches have aircraft. Therefore, it follows that all pilots should communicate. 
Crossovers that would necessitate that degree of collocation typically do not exist in 
municipal emergency services. 
Fire service leaders from the Seattle area reported encountering the following 
interagency collaboration barriers: 
• Difficult egos 
• Ignorance 
• Adherence to traditional mindsets 
• Competition for money 
• A lack of opportunity to field-test plans 
• Difficulty funding equipment and training 
The collaboration barriers listed above convey perceived difficulties with 
organizational relationships and funding. Fire service leaders reported that discovering 
how to implement collaboration is more difficult that deciding what to do. Fire service 
leaders indicated that the groundwork and processes necessary to further collaboration 
are in place. They also expressed that collaboration is often a more difficult path, but 
necessary and worthwhile. 
 
137 Bea, National Preparedness System, 7. 
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F. THE SEATTLE FIRE DEPARTMENT AND THE TOPOFF 2 EXERCISE 
TOPOFF 2 was a Congressionally-mandated, national terrorism exercise that was 
designed to identify vulnerabilities in the nation’s domestic incident management 
capability. At the time, TOPOFF 2 was the largest and most comprehensive terrorism 
exercise ever conducted in the United States. The exercise scenario, which was played 
out from May 12-16, 2003, depicted a fictitious, foreign terrorist organization that 
detonated a simulated Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) in Seattle.138 SFD’s 
TOPOFF 2 experience is an important part of the interagency collaboration story in 
Seattle because the interaction it required among disciplines and levels of government 
exposed capability strengths and gaps.139 It also presented a rare opportunity for the SFD 
to exercise their major incident response plans. Chief Hepburn of the SFD summarized 
the successes, failures, and regrets: 
In many ways, our TOPOFF 2 experience was successful. The majority of 
the exercise went well, and we benefited from the experience. We 
demonstrated that cooperation with other city departments, state, and 
federal agencies was achievable. I was in charge of the medical branch. 
We had four Advanced Life Support (ALS) agencies, three ambulance 
companies, and multiple hospitals working together. There were also some 
huge failures, including our own. We had a small, hastily thrown together 
logistics section. The realization that TOPOFF 2 was a logistically-driven 
incident escaped us. 
For the SFD, the big takeaway lesson was that we need to get better at 
managing logistics. Our comprehensive advanced planning efforts were 
sabotaged by poor logistics. I learned that you can have the best strategic 
and tactical plans in the world, but if the troops are hungry and thirsty, you 
are an idiot. At TOPOFF 2, we relied on an outside agency to provide food 
and they didn’t come through. A lot of the food we had prearranged went 
to the media, other observers, and exercise guests. To me, our reliance on 
the outside agency for food support was an opportunity lost. We need to 
learn how to do that for ourselves. 
 
138  Top Officials Exercise Series: TOPOFF 2 The After Action Summary Report For Public Release 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2003). 
139  Clark S. Kimerer, Practice Makes Perfect: Strengthening Homeland Security by Exercising 
Terrorism Scenarios, trans. United States House of Representatives, Select Committee on Homeland 
Security (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004), 2. 
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Fire service leaders also explained that interacting with LE officials at the 
exercise was difficult. The SFD and SPD command posts were at separate locations. 
Chief Hepburn expressed some regrets: 
If we could repeat the exercise, I would like to see one command post 
where the fire department, police department, and the FBI would be 
together making joint decisions. I would establish a logistics section that 
covered the entire incident, not just the fire department. Also, there were 
problems that may have gone unrecognized. Information flow from the 
incident scene to the EOC was handled poorly. We need to improve the 
connectivity between the Seattle EOC, King County EOC, and the 
Washington state EOC. We need to determine who needs to know what 
outside the incident perimeter. 
 
G. THE SEATTLE FIRE DEPARTMENT AND THE WTO 
The third WTO ministerial conference was held in Seattle in early December, 
1999.140 The subsequent rioting and civil disturbances, described by the media as “the 
battle in Seattle,” resulted in a large and reactionary public safety response that lasted 
approximately a week. During the incident, intense media attention was focused on 
Seattle as protests gave way to escalating riots. Although the incident involved primarily 
LE agencies, the SFD provided EMS, extinguished small fires associated with the riots, 
and provided senior staff to assist with incident management. Because the WTO incident 
involved an emergency declaration, the activation of local and state emergency plans, and 
required the coordination of multiple levels of government, it is comparable to a terrorism 
incident in terms of logistical support. The SFD had “preloaded” the mutual aid request 
that ultimately allowed the Washington State Fire Mobilization to occur. Regarding the 
subsequent mobilization, Chief Hepburn related a discovery he made about the value and 
necessity of logistical support at large incidents: 
I had a humbling experience at the WTO. We invoked the Washington 
State Mobilization Act and requested task forces.141 When you get task 
forces, you also get a state overhead team. I was the SFD liaison to the 
team, which was located at Boeing Field. The Incident Commander (IC)  
140  “The Third WTO Ministerial Conference,” New York, NY September 26, 2005.  Available from 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/min99_e.htm. (accessed October 29, 2005), 1. 
141  “Washington Fire Services Resource Mobilization Plan,” in Washington State Patrol [database 
online]. Olympia, WA August 1, 2005. Available from http://www.wsp.wa.gov/fire/mobeplan. (accessed 
October 9, 2005), 1. 
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of the state overhead team was the fire chief from Benton County, 
Washington, Fire District #1. Immediately, I asked myself “what does this 
guy know, coming into the big city?” I’m glad I didn’t open my mouth, 
because he knew plenty. He knew the expanded ICS well because he had 
used it regularly on wildfires. 
When WTO escalated, there was a 2 p.m. meeting held to determine how 
to provide logistical support for the 1,100 cops at the incident. The 
logistics section chief was from the Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR). We decided to use the Kingdome. We planned to use Kingdome 
vendor food and cots from the Red Cross. To accomplish this, we had to 
get permission from the King County Executive, Ron Sims, the Seattle 
Seahawks football organization, and the National Football League (NFL). 
The necessary contracts were cut, and by 6:30 p.m. dinner for 1,100 cops 
was served. The plan was devised and executed in four hours. The task 
was simple for the Benton County chief because of his operational 
experience. That’s an example of “big picture logistics.” If we have a 
major incident, we are going to have to think about things we don’t 
normally think about, such as housing, showering, and feeding an 
extraordinarily large number of people. 
 
H. INFORMATION SHARING AND INTELLIGENCE 
Since 9/11, terror attacks at home and abroad have forced the realization 
throughout the first responder community that no single discipline is capable of 
successfully managing a significant terror attack single handedly. Recent attacks (New 
York, Madrid, and London) have prompted collective planning and preparedness 
activities among disciplines that had previously only had acquaintance relationships. This 
nascent collaboration between disciplines and levels of government, in the name of 
preparedness, has also highlighted the need for information sharing and a re-examination 
of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. 
Chief Tim Kimsey from the POSPD summarized why fire departments should 
continue developing collaborative relationships with their interagency partners: 
Where does fire end and police begin for terrorism response? It is 
impossible to draw an exact line. There has to be coordination. Before 
9/11, most of the thinking was compartmentalized. This is ours, that is 
yours, and never the two will mix. Today, there is a realization that we 
will have to work together. Generally speaking, one of the positives that 
resulted from 9/11 is the realization and understanding that none of us can 
do it alone and that we have to cooperate. 
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Seattle area fire departments rely heavily on sharing core information with other 
public safety agencies to perform their crisis and consequence management duties. Yet, 
fire department policies do not address intelligence and firefighters have only recently 
become peripherally involved with it. Fire department operating guidelines lack 
instructions for discreetly reporting terrorism-related information that they may receive to 
their LE counterparts. As fire departments seek inclusion in intelligence operations they 
should be careful not to violate the trust of the public. 
The SFD’s first experience with collaborative intelligence sharing was in 1999 
during the WTO meeting preparations. Currently, one lieutenant performs the intelligence 
liaison function one-quarter time as a collateral duty. Other than the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) that SFD has maintained with the FBI, their intelligence 
involvement has been minimal. Only one SFD representative has the ability to visit the 
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) at will, access information, process it for mission 
relevance, and share it with fire department leadership. Other JTTF representatives, 
typically from LE agencies, are represented full-time, co-located, and have the 
opportunity to share information in real time. The SFD’s existing arrangement is 
functional, but not optimal. 
Seattle area fire departments should increase their intelligence activity and 
involvement in two ways. First, they should get more involved to ensure that intelligence 
reports are received and acted upon, enhancing both their preparedness and consequence 
management activities. Second, firefighters should capitalize on their existing level of 
training and community presence. Firefighters have the unique opportunity to discreetly 
detect and pass along potentially valuable information to LE agencies. 
Why should fire departments concern themselves with intelligence operations? 
Any information received about intended targets, dissemination devices, or methods of 
attack could result in a valuable head start for planning an effective response. Currently, 
information flows across pathways built on personal relationships. It should be systemic. 
Firefighters need generic information, gleaned from intelligence, about the nature of 
credible threats. They can manage only a limited amount of sensitive information because 
the logistical infrastructure necessary to responsibly store and utilize classified materials 
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is not in place. Intelligence must be “sanitized” prior to its dispersal because only a few 
fire department members have the necessary security clearances. Most of the few existing 
fire department security clearances were issued to fire department members during their 
prior military service. 
Fire departments must exercise caution as they become more involved with 
intelligence. Over-sharing intelligence is dangerous because other connected elements of the 
system could be damaged. Only a few department leaders meet the “need to know” criterion. 
Also, fire department leaders should recognize that useful intelligence might be obtained 
from existing relationships not traditionally associated with intelligence. Public health, 
seismological, and agricultural agencies could provide actionable intelligence to fire 
department first responders. Materials received and shared department-wide should be 
considered “Law Enforcement Sensitive” or “For Official Use Only (FOUO).” These 
materials could be used in an IAP or NIMS/ICS planning document and should be protected. 
Following are six recommendations for integrating fire departments with the 
information sharing and intelligence enterprise: 
• Fire departments should review their policies and procedures related to the 
physical storage, organization, safeguarding, and dissemination of 
information. They should build on existing best practices related to the 
storage of patient medical information. 
• Fire departments should create, package, and store information so that it is 
readily sharable with other agencies. Pre-incident surveys, maps, hazardous 
materials plume-models, and target folders may be valuable to other partner 
agencies. 
• Fire departments should acquire “awareness level” training about the 
different levels of security attached to information and what responsibilities 
are inherently included in accessing it. 
• Fire departments should define and articulate their information requirements 
to information sharing partners and intelligence producers. Fire departments 
should proactively teach their interagency partners what kind of information 
is valuable to them and why. By clearly articulating their information needs, 
fire departments can increase the likelihood of receiving useful information. 
Terrorism intelligence, however, is largely viewed as being outside of the 




                                                
• Fire departments should investigate the security clearance process and 
attempt to get more of their members cleared. Collectively, the fire service 
should also seek representation at the Homeland Security Operations Center 
(HSOC).142 
• Fire departments should practice using the intelligence support function 
included in NIMS/ICS and incorporate it more fully in functional and full 
scale exercises. Doing so will illuminate the ongoing need fire departments 
have for pertinent consequence management information. 
 
Fire service officials confirmed that they have experienced difficulties entering the 
intelligence and information sharing arena. Specifically, they reported difficulty obtaining 
security clearances for their members and developing trust with intelligence entities. They 
acknowledged that they lack the ability to store and process any intelligence they might 
receive. Chief Hepburn explained the current intelligence situation: 
LE agencies are going to have to trust the fire department. They are 
holding all the intelligence cards, and they might give us some cryptic 
information once in a while. It has to be a better partnership. Also, we 
need representation at the JTTF. Not full-time, but we do need to be 
invited in periodically. We don’t need to know everything. There are 
cultural issues hampering that effort. They have only accepted our ex-
military people that had existing clearances. The bottom line is that we 
need to be included. 
 
I. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined firefighters’ homeland security role, organizational 
culture, and collaborative relationships. These combined factors have created both 
opportunities and challenges for fire departments in the Seattle area homeland security 
environment. The analysis of firefighters’ homeland security role produced three 
interesting conclusions. First, their homeland security role is a seemingly natural 
extension of their traditional role. Terrorism incident response is similar to what 
firefighters have always done. Their current challenge is to respond collectively as part of 
a complex interrelated system. Second, fire departments have not meaningfully engaged 
themselves in terrorism prevention, which is a clear national priority. Third, fire service 
 
142 The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) serves as the nation’s nerve center for 
information sharing and domestic incident management. Its goal is to collect and fuse information from a 
variety of sources everyday to help deter, detect, and prevent terrorist acts. For more detailed information 
on the HSOC, see http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3814. (accessed July 1, 2005), 1. 
92 
                                                
organizations have an opportunity to support their law enforcement counterparts with 
information, training, and physical “hot zone” experience. 
The fire service organizational culture is distinctly different from the cultures of their 
peer disciplines. It is characterized by teamwork, problem solving, and public trust. These 
factors, combined with firefighters’ strong community presence, provide opportunities to 
advance the public health and law enforcement agendas as well as their own. 
Fire service organizations have extensive history and experience with the ICS. 
This provides them with an opportunity to promote the system’s use across disciplines 
and ultimately increase the effectiveness of multi-agency incident responses. However, 
their use of the system is routine and repetitive and has not prepared them well for a 
major incident. The current challenge facing fire departments is learning to use the 
system in its expanded format with other jurisdictions, disciplines, and levels of 
government. Regarding unified command, fire departments should continue to practice 
with their agency partners to learn more about them and their skill sets, to increase their 
overall preparedness, and to manage challenging incidents. 
Fire department officials reported a continued interest and benefit in conducting 
scenario-based training. However, the scenarios were criticized by public safety officials 
as not being specific or adaptable enough to rate more than mild interest. Analysis of fire 
department collaboration with other disciplines produced three key findings: 
• Real events, whether exercises or actual emergencies, involving the active 
participation of multiple organizations have enhanced collaboration and 
preparedness. The impact that plans, agreements, and other administrative 
arrangements have had on collaboration is inconclusive.143 
• Fire service officials reported that interagency collaboration is effective at 
both the top and bottom organizational levels. An opportunity exists to 
improve collaborative relationships at the mid-management level. 
• The “interagency experience,” characterized by interaction with disciplines, 
jurisdictions, and levels of government, including knowledge of their 
processes, should be created for mid-ranking fire department officers. 
The majority of panelists argued that collocation with other disciplines in order to 
increase contact was unnecessary. Instead, focusing on periodic multi-agency drills and 
exercise was judged more practical and valuable for preparedness. The minority argued  
143  Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan (Seattle, WA: Seattle Police Department, 2004), 3-15. 
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the alternate position that collocation was necessary. Other than the EM function, the 
author discovered no evidence of existing permanent collocation of multiple disciplines 
in the Seattle urban area at the time of this writing. 
Because of their community presence and frequent public interaction, firefighters 
should develop information sharing and intelligence capabilities. In addition to receiving 
information that would enhance their response, fire departments can assist law 
enforcement by discreetly passing on information they might detect or receive from the 
public. However, the trust of the public is a valuable fire department resource that could 
be endangered by entering into intelligence operations. Municipal fire departments 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Routine emergencies, the kind of garden-variety incidents that local public safety 
agencies have experience with and regularly engage, have not necessarily prepared them 
to successfully respond to and manage catastrophic terrorism. In most American cities, 
including Seattle’s urban area, homeland security incident response systems are better 
equipped to handle routinely-occurring emergencies than major terrorist incidents. Public 
safety resources are rapidly engaged and depleted, even during predictable emergencies, 
leaving jurisdictions exposed and lacking necessary coverage for resource-intensive 
terrorism events. 
The majority of preparedness activity currently underway in America’s fifty urban 
areas is geared toward terrorism incident response and is federally supported.144 Will the 
capabilities resulting from these preparedness activities “fall away” when and if federal 
assistance ceases? The challenge now facing urban areas is internalizing and benefiting 
from current collaborative experiences and opportunities while they exist. 
Collectively, from the first responder perspective, we are better prepared today 
than we were on 9/11. But with the absence of any new U.S. terror attacks, compliance 
with federal homeland security guidance has become a “check the box, hit the feeder bar, 
and get a pellet” sort of operation.145 The collective realization that interagency 
collaboration is a necessary and key component of a lasting solution is apparent. 
However, the will to follow through by creating true integration of disciplines, 
amazingly, is absent. The overwhelming sense of urgency, felt so strongly by first 
responders after 9/11, has receded and been replaced by a more methodical commitment 
to work together. 
Have American cities effectively utilized federal guidance, assistance, and 
programs to develop and expand lasting capabilities? Are federal homeland security 
programs and support causing interagency collaboration to flourish in urban areas? Have 
they stimulated interagency cooperation at the local level? Public safety officials 
 
144  Urban Area Security Initiative Seattle-King County Urban Area Strategy: Goals and Objectives, 
(Seattle, Washington: King County Metro, 2004), 1-12. 
145 Acting Assistant Chief of Special Operations, SFD, in discussion with the author, March 3, 2005. 
96 
                                                
representing multiple homeland security disciplines reported that federal guidance has 
stimulated meaningful collaboration among public safety agencies. Yet they unanimously 
reported that much work remains to become “fully prepared.” The NPS clearly 
demonstrate necessary performance requirements. Casualty estimates, ranging from 
several hundred to several hundred thousand, suggest that terrorism incident performance 
capabilities should be residing at the top of public safety officials’ agendas.146 
The original and central motivation for this thesis was to address the apparent gap 
between current and necessary response performance levels. Observing the interaction 
among key homeland security disciplines in the Seattle urban area has produced valuable 
insight into the homeland security environment that hopefully will benefit other urban areas. 
The remainder of this chapter offers general summary and conclusions. First, it 
provides an assessment of discipline roles and responsibilities. Next, it summarizes 
analysis of the NIMS/ICS and the NPS. It continues with a discussion of collaboration 
successes and challenges among disciplines. Six major finding emerge:147 
• The public health discipline faces the greatest challenges adapting its 
organizational culture to homeland security requirements. 
• The National Planning Scenarios have not been fully embraced due to a 
perceived lack of realism. 
• Emphasis on preparing for catastrophic terrorism may be coming at the 
price of “all hazards” preparedness for more likely emergencies. 
• There is a need for greater clarity about the “lead agency” role. 
• The NIMS/ICS has been an effective model where it has been embraced. 
• Some of the most challenging collaboration issues concern sharing 
information and intelligence. 
The chapter concludes with positive policy recommendations for public safety 
officials and decision-makers. 
  
146  National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries (Washington, D.C.: Homeland Security 
Council, 2004). 
147 These conclusions support recent analysis of approximately fifty Mobile Education Team (MET) 
sessions conducted over a three year period in states, cities, and with issue interest groups. MET seminars 
are conducted by teams comprised of nationally recognized experts in various areas related to homeland 
security. Additional information about the METS program can be located at 
https://www.chds.us/public.php?met. Christopher Bellavita, online class forum discussion with the author, 
January, 2006, https://www.chds.us/courses/mod/forum/discuss.php?d=1700. (accessed February, 2006). 
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A. HOMELAND SECURITY DISCIPLINES 
This thesis examines the interaction between four key homeland security 
disciplines (fire, police, emergency management, and public health) in the Seattle, 
Washington urban area. The focus of this study was to generate a detailed description of 
the homeland security environment, to identify challenges facing first response agencies, 
and to describe the strengths and gaps in their relationships. Based on assessments from 
key public safety officials, a national survey, and the author’s analysis, this thesis 
describes the urban area homeland security environment and landscape from the inside. It 
explains where and why agencies have collaborated and offers recommendations 
detailing how they can be further supported in their cooperative efforts. 
The central argument presented here is that increased collaboration between 
homeland security disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government is necessary to 
meet the performance challenges forecasted by the NPS and other federal guidance. 
Local interagency cooperation should be further supported in specific ways, by specific 
key personnel, at specific organizational levels. 
The evidence offered to support the claim is the existence of a performance gap 
between actual and necessary incident response capabilities. This gap, or the difference 
between the casualty estimates contained in the NPS and performance estimates derived 
from Seattle area public safety officials’ statements, is significant. Urban areas’ ability to 
effectively treat and manage terror victims post-attack is suspect. Even optimistic 
performance estimates from the Seattle area, which is a well-prepared urban area, fall far 
short of needed capabilities. The overall outlook is grim and suggests that first response 
agencies still have much preparedness work left to accomplish in order to adequately 
protect their communities from catastrophic terrorism. However, positive first steps have 
resulted in tangible performance benefits. In certain areas, federal guidance and programs 
have stimulated cooperation among disciplines and enhanced preparedness. 
The Seattle urban area, closely examined in this study, has benefited through 
practice, experience, and compliance with federal programs and guidance. The Seattle 
area has been recognized as a model for “how to prepare.”148 Their success stems from: 
 
148  Kathy George, “A Moment with Eric Holdeman, Director of Emergency Management,” Seattle 
Post-Intelligencer, 2005, sec. Local News, 1-2. 
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• An early and voluntary commitment to regional cooperation evidenced by 
multi-jurisdictional response plans and multi-agency public health 
structures. 
• The existence of mutual aid agreements that are supported by interagency 
plans. 
• A regional acceptance of and experience with the Incident Command 
System (ICS). 
• A cross-discipline commitment to scenario-based training and exercising. 
 
The development and refinement of integrated disaster plans that are increasingly 
supported by higher levels of government has also aided this effort. City, county, 
regional, state, and federal plans mesh well. They are supportive of each other and are 
consistently aimed at similar outcomes. 
The Seattle urban area, like others nationally, must meet the basic expectations of 
the public in their preparedness, response, and recovery activities. Understanding public 
expectations is an important prerequisite to meeting their needs in the event of an attack. 
 
B. ESSENTIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
FOLLOWING AN ATTACK 
Public safety officials were asked to describe what the public would identify as 
the essential responsibilities and functions of local governments in the event of a 
disaster or major terrorist event.149 The summary of responses contains three distinct 
components: providing for basic human needs, providing emergency responses, and 
providing public information. 
The first component addresses the expectation that following an attack, citizens 
may become dependent on local governments to meet their most basic human needs if 
they cannot otherwise provide for themselves. These needs include emergency sheltering  
 
 
149 This study used two separate groups of respondents. The first group, called the “Delphi Panel,” 
consisted of subject matter experts representing law enforcement, fire service, emergency management, and 
public health experts from the Seattle area. The second group consists of homeland security professionals 
representing the same disciplines, but from thirty states across the country. The national group participated 
in an electronic survey conducted on the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) secure portal website in 
July-September, 2005. For the purposes of this paper, results are referred to by the author as local, national, 
or combined. 
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and the distribution of necessary supplies including food, water, and medicine. The 
public also expects local governments to coordinate their efforts with humanitarian 
organizations when necessary. 
The second component describes an expectation for coordinated emergency 
response. The public expects local governments to take immediate coordinated actions to 
minimize the effects of an attack on individuals. They expect local governments to 
prevent further damages and to restore government services and commerce as quickly as 
possible. Citizens expect first response agencies to “put communities back together” after 
an attack and minimize the impacts of an attack through their actions. 
The third component details the immediate need for information by citizens. The 
public expects local governments, through the media if necessary, to keep them informed 
as events transpire. Specifically, people need information they can use to help 
themselves. They want information that addresses their “return to normalcy.” National 
survey respondents and Delphi panel members both related experiences that confirmed 
the public attaches a high degree of importance to communication regarding events. 
Public safety officials, both locally and nationally, agreed in this assessment of 
public expectations post-attack. A clear delineation and understanding of homeland 
security roles among disciplines will be required to meet the public’s expectations. 
 
C. DEFINING HOMELAND SECURITY ROLES 
Table 1 lists the primary homeland security roles of each of the four disciplines 
examined here. At the beginning of this process, I originally concluded that homeland 
security roles were not clearly delineated and were misunderstood by first responders, 
resulting in performance problems. At the conclusion of the process, a different picture 
emerged. With three notable exceptions, results show that homeland security roles are 
distinctive in purpose, well-understood by public safety officials, and agreed on by 
service providers and consumers. These findings emerged from the combined results. 
First, law enforcement agencies and public health organizations were associated 
with terrorism prevention, while fire departments and EMAs were not. Fire departments 
did not report prevention as a homeland security role, nor was it reported for them by 
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their peers. EMAs reported prevention as a central homeland security role, but this was 
not validated by the other disciplines who viewed emergency managers primarily as 
coordinators and supporters of others’ activities. 
Second, public health and EMAs were associated with emergency public 
communications. However, fire and police departments were not. Fire and police 
agencies were more closely associated with the physical aspects of first response than the 
other disciplines were. This finding is noteworthy because all four disciplines have public 
communication responsibilities, but only two of them were recognized by the group as 
having public communication as a central homeland security role. 
Third, both fire and police agencies were closely associated with initial incident 
scene control activity, while public health and EMAs were not. At emergency scenes, 
during the initial incident phase, fire and police roles are similar and distinguishing 
distinct features between them is difficult. This finding was self-reported by police and 
fire departments and validated by their peer agencies. Regarding central homeland 
security roles, fire departments reported responsibility for incident stabilization and scene 
control, while law enforcement agencies reported responsibility for scene security and 
the preservation of order. Although subtly different, these roles have narrowed, 
specifically during the initial incident stages. One explanation for this is both disciplines 
have become more experienced with NIMS/ICS and their roles have become more 
interdependent in terms of PPE. Preparing for terrorism response has drawn fire and 
police roles more closely together. 
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Table 1. Primary Homeland Security Roles: 
 
D. THE NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
HSPD 5 required the Secretary of the DHS to develop and implement a National 
Response Plan (NRP).151 The NRP, formally released on January 5, 2005 was designed for 
use by all federal, state, and local response agencies. It provides them with an overarching 
template for domestic incident response. The NRP also integrates prevention, preparedness, 
and response guidelines into a single “all-discipline” and “all-hazards” plan.152 The NIMS 
                                                 
150 Table 1 lists the primary homeland security roles of the FD, LE, PH, and EM disciplines as reported 
by homeland security professionals representing the four disciplines. The results in Table 1 are a 
combination of the Delphi panel members and national survey respondents. Shaded areas indicate instances 
where similar roles were reported for two disciplines. 
151  Homeland Security Presidential Directive/ HSPD -5 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2003). 
152  National Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005). 
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and the ICS language it contains should be serving as a catalyst for interagency cooperation 
and as the single “sheet of music” that all public safety agencies follow.153 
It should also be the primary tool that first response agencies use to enact the plan. 
Simply stated, the meaning of the new federal policy is “many different agencies, one 
Incident Management System (IMS) and one response plan”. NIMS/ICS is sweeping in 
its inclusiveness, seemingly simple in its unity of effort, and well supported by 
government structures and guidance. NIMS/ICS was implemented to assist public safety 
agencies in achieving preparedness and integration, and to some degree, it has. Yet public 
safety officials, both locally and nationally, reported that its level of acceptance, its 
perceived usefulness, and its implementation varied greatly by discipline and region. 
 
1. NIMS: National Analysis 
The analysis in this section is based on the national survey and therefore offers 
more general conclusions than those provided by the Delphi panel members who focused 
on the Seattle area. Homeland security professionals, representing state and local 
agencies from multiple disciplines across the country, were questioned about NIMS/ICS 
and its usefulness, degree of acceptance, and frequency of use. 
The national survey respondents described the NIMS/ICS as a highly useful tool 
that has been formally adopted by state and local governments. Its adoption has been 
reflected in policies and plans, yet it has only been marginally accepted in certain regions, 
and is not frequently used.154 Respondents recognized that its formal adoption would 
have the effect of forcing all disciplines into a common incident management structure 
which was described as positive. 
Currently, its acceptance varies greatly by region. Greatest along the U.S. west 
coast, its acceptance and subsequent implementation wanes moving eastward. Survey 
respondents reported the perception that NIMS/ICS is more appropriate for use at large, 
multi-agency events and less appropriate for use as an everyday tool. 
 
153  National Incident Management System (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004). 
154 The distinction between NIMS/ICS adoption, acceptance, and implementation is noteworthy. 
Adoption means “reflected in plans and policies,” accepted means “believed in” by personnel, and 
implemented means “actually being used regularly.” 
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This perception is important for two reasons. First, the scalability and flexibility 
of NIM/ICS should allow its equally beneficial use at incidents of all sizes and levels of 
complexity. Agencies that fail to use it routinely cannot expect to get more value from it 
without additional practice. The misperception that NIMS/ICS is only useful for large or 
complex incidents should be addressed through additional training and practice. This will 
be more challenging for public health agencies to accomplish because it does not fit as 
well with their routine daily activities. They have fewer opportunities to put the system to 
practical use. 
The reported variance on NIMS/ICS acceptance is subdivided into three 
categories for closer examination: fully accepted, working towards acceptance, and 
encountering resistance. Respondents (combined) that reported full acceptance of 
NIMS/ICS also unanimously reported some degree of pre-existing acceptance or 
experience using the system which supports the notion that additional practice and 
experience leads to greater acceptance. 
The national survey respondents that reported they are currently working toward 
acceptance also stated that while they may have conceptually accepted it, their agencies 
have not yet implemented NIMS/ICS in practice. Specific comments such as “we are 
getting behind the concept”, “we are 80 percent there”, and “we are working to accept it” 
typified this group’s responses. 
The national survey respondents who reported resistance with NIMS/ICS 
associated it with overly aggressive implementation timelines, difficulty replacing old 
habits, and a lack of its implementation as a top priority. The resistance that the 
respondents encountered, however, was described as passive. Because it is so strongly 
supported by federal guidance and government structures, there are no other viable 
alternatives to using NIMS/ICS in the future. 
The majority of national survey respondents indicated that although NIMS/ICS is 
perceived as useful and has been at least conceptually accepted, its frequency of usage 




                                                
area specifically, and the west coast generally, the NIMS/ICS acceptance and usage is 
much higher because of ties to western wildfire agencies, practical experience, and early 
and voluntary adoption practices. 
 
2. NIMS: Seattle Area Analysis 
The Seattle urban area has recognized, accepted, and formally adopted 
NIMS/ICS. Therefore, if you believe that “practice makes perfect”, then the Seattle urban 
area and others that have measurable experience with NIMS/ICS have an effective head 
start over other urban areas that have not. Americans who watched the hurricane Katrina 
response unfold on television in late August 2005 would have concluded that the 
NIMS/ICS had not been accepted, practiced, or implemented by first responders to the 
degree necessary for use by multiple agencies at major incidents. In the final report on the 
status of their recommendations, the 9/11 Commission similarly found that “although 
there is awareness of and some training in the ICS, hurricane Katrina demonstrated the 
absence of full compliance during a multi-jurisdictional/statewide catastrophe, and its 
resulting costs.”155 
Although hurricanes and terrorist attacks differ, they are comparable in terms of 
incident size, impacts, and resource intensiveness. The Katrina example is mentioned not 
to assign blame, but rather to demonstrate that more teamwork is necessary if agencies 
from multiple disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government plan on using it 
successfully in the future. 
Each of the four Seattle area homeland security disciplines reported unique 
experiences with, and assessment of, the NIMS/ICS. Fire department personnel were 
described by their peers as the NIMS/ICS “resident experts” and fire service officials 
tacitly agreed with that assessment. Of the four disciplines examined, firefighters 





155  Thomas H. Kean, Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: 9/11 
Public Discourse Project, 2005), 1. 
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wildfire agencies and their long history with the ICS, fire service organizations claim 
parentage over the current system. Yet their use of the system, although widespread, 
tends to be routine and repetitive.156 
Unlike wildfire agencies, municipal fire departments tend to use it roughly the 
same way each time to manage regularly occurring emergencies. Similar and repetitive 
types of responses, incident locations, and command structures typify this kind of 
activity. This is significantly different from the way they would need to implement the 
system for catastrophic terrorism response. Routine use of NIMS/ICS by municipal fire 
departments rarely includes multiple disciplines, jurisdictions, or levels of government. 
Law enforcement agencies in the Seattle area have also accepted NIMS/ICS, but 
police officers use of NIMS/ICS has not become instinctive yet, as it has for firefighters. 
Police officers view NIMS/ICS as a tool for use in major, not minor or routine incidents. 
Their use of the system does not fit as neatly into their work model as it does for fire 
departments. Because police officers work in a highly decentralized, mobile, and sometimes 
solitary environments, NIMS/ICS is not a “natural fit” like it is for firefighters who work in 
teams or groups of teams at concentrated locations. Police officers associate their use of the 
NIMS/ICS with incidents where large numbers of officers are grouped together. 
Public health agencies have accepted NIMS/ICS and are rapidly gaining 
experience using it. Public health officials described NIMS/ICS as rarely applicable to 
their daily duties and associate its use exclusively with incident response. It has not 
worked as well for them as it has for the uniformed first response agencies. In this regard, 
NIMS/ICS has been an “uncomfortable fit” for public health agencies. Because of 
differences in their daily activities, level of training and experience with it, and 
organizational cultural differences, public health agencies provided distinctly different 
analysis of NIMS/ICS than their peers did. 
The Seattle area emergency management discipline has fully embraced the 
NIMS/ICS and takes partial credit for its implementation across the local homeland 
security system. Emergency managers rely on NIMS/ICS concepts to perform their 
 
156 Municipal fire departments “routine and repetitive” use of NIMS/ICS is further described as 
typically not involving multiple jurisdictions, disciplines, or levels of government. 
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routine duties and they actually implement the system during EOC activations. Their 
peers associated them with the proliferation of the system across disciplines. Emergency 
managers, similar to firefighters, are uniquely positioned to hasten the implementation of 
the system because of their practical experience with it and their pre-existing 
organizational relationships with other agencies. Because emergency managers are 
viewed by their peers as the “keepers of the plans and protocols” they are positioned to 
dictate the pace of NIMS/ICS adoption, implementation, and usage system-wide. 
 
E. THE NATIONAL PLANNING SCENARIOS 
The NPS were developed by a federal interagency working group and 
subsequently approved by the Homeland Security Council. These scenarios illustrate the 
range of threats and hazards facing the nation and outline the potential scope, magnitude, 
and complexity of these events.157 The NPS serve as terrorism response performance 
benchmarks for public safety agencies to achieve together.158 Analysis of the NPS 
produced both positive and negative results. The combined results were consistent. 
Scenario-based training was validated as an effective and valuable concept for 
increasing teamwork and enhancing capabilities across disciplines. Yet the NPS themselves 
were largely dismissed as being a driver of interagency collaboration for three reasons. 
First, the scenarios are new and have not been fully digested by public safety agencies yet. 
Second, they were described as unrealistic, especially for smaller and rural areas. Third, 
according to public safety officials, they do not reflect likely occurrences that urban areas 
have determined they need to be prepared for. In this regard, they were described as “not 
scalable or adaptable enough” to meet the specific needs of local governments. 
Regarding the scenarios’ realism, a wide range of responses were reported. 
Respondents agreed that the scenarios are more realistic and useful for urban areas than 
they are for smaller or rural communities.159 The majority of respondents described the 
 
157  “Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program Newsletter, November 2005, Issue 4,” in 
Office for Domestic Preparedness [database online]. Washington, D.C. November 28, 2005. Available 
from www.llis.gov. (accessed December 1, 2005), 1. 
158  Barbara Biehn, Office for Domestic Preparedness, Email Communication with the Author, 2005. 
159 Prompting the author to question the applicability of the NPS to rural areas, Chief Hepburn from the 
SFD asked: is the term “rural terrorism” an oxymoron? 
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NPS as “unrealistic.” The minority of respondents, who described the scenarios as 
“realistic,” also stressed the importance of local governments being supportive of national 
programs and priorities. In this regard, I sensed unwillingness on the participants’ part to 
“bite the hand that feeds” by being openly critical and therefore jeopardizing future 
federal financial assistance. Only larger jurisdictions (urban areas) described the NPS as 
“useful for planning purposes.” 
Most respondents also agreed that because the NPS are relatively new, they had 
only used portions or elements of them. Although they were described as “promising,” 
the majority of respondents had not yet had time to fully evaluate them. When asked to 
describe the likelihood that the NPS would drive interagency collaboration, the majority 
of respondents reported that it was “low” or “unlikely.” Because the respondents did 
associate real or perceived threats with increased collaboration, the scenarios’ perceived 
lack of realism could explain this. 
Respondents reported that the scenarios’ biggest advantage is their uniformity. 
Because they provide a relatively fixed target for different disciplines, jurisdictions, and 
levels of government to aim at, comparisons about planning, preparing, and exercising 
can be effectively shared. 
Criticisms of the NPS were consistent locally and nationally. The three most 
prominent criticisms were associated with the scenarios’ development, their content, and 
their lack of realism. Because the NPS were developed exclusively by federal or federally 
contracted people, they were judged as being “not reflective of local needs.” The lack of local 
government input in their development was described by public safety officials as “short-
sighted.” The scenarios’ content was described as “weighted too heavily towards terrorism.” 
Twelve of the total fifteen scenarios are terror-related. Only three of the scenarios, 
pandemic influenza, hurricane, and earthquake, reflect naturally occurring events.160 
Public health and emergency management representatives strongly suggested that the 
NPS were developed at the expense of all-hazards planning and preparation. The 
scenarios, described as “doomsday events” by some public safety officials, were also 
described as unrealistic and not indicative of hazards facing local communities. 
 
160  National Planning Scenarios: Executive Summaries, 55. 
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F. COMMITMENT TO INTERAGENCY COOPERATION 
Regarding interagency cooperation, respondents were asked about which 
homeland security goals require most collaboration, how their organization’s 
commitment to collaboration has been reflected, and specifically which plans, programs, 
or resources had aided them in their efforts. When asked about homeland security goals 
that could not be achieved alone, public safety officials indicated that the majority of 
homeland security goals require collaboration between disciplines and cannot be 
achieved in isolation. During interviews, this line of questioning proved to be of limited 
value because interagency cooperation is a necessary prerequisite of goal completion. 
The most frequent responses from the national survey about goals that required 
collaboration were interoperability, bio-terror response, events involving explosives, 
cyber-events, managing elements of the private sector, and agricultural events. 
The commitment, made by public safety agencies towards interagency 
cooperation, is typically reflected in written plans and agreements, reinforced through 
regular meetings, and practiced during exercises and actual emergencies. The specific 
language most frequently can be located in emergency operations manuals, mutual aid 
agreements, and individual agency policies. Respondents unanimously agreed and 
emphasized that commitment defined and demonstrated through participation in training 
and exercise events was equally as important as the existence of written agreements. 
Written commitments to cooperate were described as “an important prerequisite” to 
meaningful cooperation. 
Delphi panel members from the Seattle area reported three positive features 
related to interagency cooperation. The first was the formal commitment to cooperate 
detailed in the Seattle Disaster Readiness and Response Plan, which is supported by 
monthly meetings of the DMC. The DMC, chaired by the Director of Emergency 
Management, has representation from all the ESFs and is the forum where senior leaders 
focus on interagency communication, goal setting, and plan development.161 
The second positive feature was the mayor’s formal adoption of the NIMS/ICS. 
The formal adoption has enhanced collaboration in the Seattle area because it has 
 
161 More complete information about Emergency Support Functions (ESF) can be located at 
http://www.fema.gov/about/esf.shtm (accessed December 1, 2005). 
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removed alternatives, established a timeline for implementation, and has effectively 
enforced compliance with the NIMS implementation plan.162 
The third reported benefit, UASI funding, has also enhanced collaboration in the 
Seattle area primarily through support of multi-agency exercises, equipment purchases, 
and associated training.163 The most frequently occurring training sessions, called 
Tabletop Exercises (TTX), have resulted in meaningful interagency networking. TTX are 
moderate in cost, easy to plan, and create opportunities for first response agencies to “talk 
through” potential terrorism situations with each other. Alternately, Full Scale Exercises 
(FSE), where first responders actually engage mock scenarios together, provides the most 
benefit. However, they are also more expensive, resource intensive, and time consuming 
to produce. Therefore, they occur with less frequency. 
 
G. COLLABORATION BARRIERS 
Table 2 lists the collaboration barriers reported by the Delphi panel members and 
the national survey respondents. The shaded areas in Table 2 show instances where 
similar collaboration barriers were reported both locally and nationally, suggestive of the 
pervasive nature of these problems. 
The national survey respondents were more forthcoming with descriptive 
comments about collaboration barriers than the Delphi panel members. I attribute this to 
two causes: First, the homeland security system in the Seattle urban area is functioning 
reasonably well. Second, the Delphi panel members were hesitant to discuss sensitive 
issues that would cast their peers in negative terms. However, when pressed, the Delphi 
panel members explained how cooperation challenges and collaboration barriers have 
impacted their progress in the Seattle area. Notably, similar barriers were reported both 
locally and nationally. They were: 
 
 
162 Nickels, Executive Order: 02-05 National Incident Management System, 1. 
163  “Fact Sheet: Department of Homeland Security Funding for States and Cities,” in Department of 
Homeland Security [database online]. Washington, D.C. December 8, 2005. Available from 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=755. (accessed December 8, 2005), 1. 
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• Information-sharing challenges, both technical and non-technical. The 
technical challenges were related to interoperability and data transfer 
systems and the non-technical challenges were related to terrorism 
intelligence and the transfer of protected information such as threats, 
vulnerabilities, and tips and leads. 
• Financial challenges. These challenges were related to competition among 
agencies for funding (resource allocation), not having enough flexibility to 
use available funding in the intended manner, and specifically the inability 
to use funds for Full Time Equivalency (FTE) personnel costs when 
necessary. Also, the biggest challenge of UASI funded equipment purchases 
and training programs is the on-going maintenance cost that UASI does not 
fund. UASI funds the “up-front” initial purchase costs and local 
jurisdictions pay the “downstream” costs. These subsequently “hidden” 
costs are problematic for local jurisdictions. 
• Meaningful participation challenges. Public safety agencies reported 
difficulty obtaining the meaningful participation of other agencies they 
deemed necessary and valuable to the process of preparedness. The mere 
presence and participation by agencies in the preparedness process, while 
important, is not deemed valuable without concurrent commitment, 
investment, and teamwork by the agencies’ representatives.164 Agencies that 
do participate, but simply by “going through the motions,” are 
counterproductive to the process. 
 
164  C. Bruner, L. G. Kunesh, and R. A. Knuth, What Does Research say About Interagency 




Reported Homeland Security Interagency 
Collaboration Challenges 
Seattle Urban Area Results: 
Delphi Panel 
National Results: 
ODP Secure Portal Survey 
• Incompatible Technological Systems • Interoperability 
• Parochialism • Disagreement about “Discipline-Specific” 
Agendas 
• “Jurisdictional Creep” • Lack of Meaningful Agency Participation: 
Long-Term Planning 
• Competition for Financial Resources • Inability to Use Grant Funds Effectively for 
their Intended Purposes 
• Unwillingness to Share Information 
Related to Intelligence 
• Lack of Trust and Recognition Related to 
Security Clearances 
• Difficult Interagency Communications: 
Mid-rank level 
• City-County “Turf Wars” and Associated 
Disagreements 
• Difficult Egos • Lack of Necessary Training 
• Adherence to Traditional Mindset: 
Failure to Embrace New Concepts 
• Perceived “Information Withholding” and 
“Muscle-Flexing” by Federal Agencies 
 
• Lack of Opportunity to “Field-Test” 
Plans  
• Lack of Proper Equipment  
• Difficulty Funding Necessary Training 
and Equipment Purchases  
• Too Busy with Routine Business  
• Lack of Meaningful Agency 
Participation: Drills, Exercises, and 
Training  
• Lack of Meaningful Agency Participation: 
Drills, Exercises, and Training Sessions  
 • Political and Union Issues 
 • The Perception “It Will Never Happen 
Here.” 
 
Table 2. Interagency Collaboration Challenges  
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H. STRATEGIC PLANNING 
A strategic goal of every urban area should be to improve and enhance their 
ability to respond to terrorism incidents. In order to accomplish this, agencies must 
function as a complex and interconnected system that requires cooperation from related 
homeland security disciplines, public safety agencies, jurisdictions, and levels of 
government. Developing, reaching agreement on, and implementing strategic plans to 
achieve this goal will be critical to the long term success of urban areas. The Delphi panel 
members and national survey respondents were asked how their interagency cooperation 
goals have been reflected in long term strategic plans. 
Most agencies reported that their commitments are reflected in MOU, strategic 
planning documents, interagency agreements, and mutual aid agreements. Regional 
councils, Urban Area Working Groups (UAWG), and other types of regional government 
coalitions were reported as organizations that have developed these plans. A state 
emergency manager explained in the national survey that agreements often exist more as 
a continuation of past practices than formalized agreements: 
Interagency cooperation goals are reflected in the speculative realm. 
However, I have seen very few written strategic plans. There are verbal 
goals toward an end. However, most of the folks I deal with do the least 
amount required due to time constraints and personnel issues. If agencies do 
complete a strategic plan, it is often bare bones and reflective of the reason 
for the plan rather than a true reflection of future goals. Specifically, I have 
seen very few written interagency agreements among fire departments. 
Most are based on past protocol and sealed with a handshake. 
Urban areas are required to maintain updated strategic plans by the ODP. This 
component of the federal guidance is a requirement that has benefited urban areas more 
than smaller or rural areas because they have been required to develop, update, and 
implement these longer-term strategies, whereas smaller or rural jurisdictions have not. 
Urban area strategies, along with the oversight provided by the ODP, ensure that the 
urban areas’ goals are supportive of national strategies, inclusive of multiple disciplines, 
and reflect all necessary priorities. 
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I. INTEGRATING DISCIPLINES 
Integrating key homeland security disciplines for the purpose of developing 
greater terrorism response capability has been a common goal of all urban areas and has 
been supported by national programs, guidance, and strategies since 9/11. Nationally and 
locally, public safety experts representing multiple disciplines were asked the following 
questions: What mechanisms are available for integrating disciplines on a day to day 
basis? And, is there a need to do so? 
The results were consistent and opposite of those I had originally predicted. The 
original prediction was that increasing the contact among different agencies would result 
in more collaboration and increased performance. Respondents stated that collocation 
was unnecessary because each discipline has a unique mission and because focusing 
exclusively on terrorism to the exclusion of other priorities would be a mistake. The 
majority of respondents, both locally and nationally, agreed with that assessment. 
Most respondents stated that engaging in periodic training and exercising is the 
best way to integrate disciplines. Opening training sessions to those from other 
disciplines and inviting them to participate is an easy first step. Organizational leaders 
and high level supervisors were described as more integrated with other disciplines than 
their counterparts at middle and lower organizational levels. 
The Delphi panel members reported that collaboration is effective at task level. 
Police officers, firefighters, public health workers, and emergency managers work well 
together. Also, connectivity among public safety executives at the highest organizational 
levels was described as “functional and strong.” Opportunity for further integration of 
homeland security disciplines exists at mid-organizational levels. This level is where the 
need for greater understanding of other agencies’ skill sets, capabilities, needs, and 
limitations exists. The “interagency experience” has been effectively created and 
implemented for only a select few representatives from each agency and discipline, 
typically at or near the top level. Financial, geographical, and labor issues serve as 
functional “disincentives” that prevent agencies from pushing the interagency experience 
down from upper to mid-levels. 
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A local emergency manager from the Midwest (national survey) explained the 
importance of integration: 
We need more interaction among the disciplines for integrated responses. 
No one works or succeeds alone. If we do not train for routine incidents 
together, then we are seldom able to function at disasters together. It is 
imperative that a grass roots movement take place to foster “face to face” 
communication between organizations including both leaders and players. 
A cup of coffee and informal meetings are the best mechanisms available. 
Leaders should be required to meet, share information, and work together. 
 
J. SEATTLE AREA RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Seattle urban area is functioning reasonably well in all areas of homeland 
security preparedness. However, concerns were reported about clarifying lead agency 
role, getting funding to the right places, and sharing intelligence. Following are ten 
recommendations that Seattle area public safety agencies should follow to increase 
cooperation, preparedness, and response capability throughout the Seattle urban area: 
• Meet and Exceed Public Expectations: Public safety agencies should 
demonstrate that they are protecting communities and concurrently use the 
media forum to challenge citizens to increase their own personal levels of 
preparedness. The public expects local public safety agencies, governments, 
and homeland security disciplines to demonstrate teamwork, commitment, 
and unity of effort in their preparedness and response activities. Widely-
reported public safety successes can be used to motivate the public to 
increase their personal preparedness. A well-prepared public will be easier 
to manage in crisis. 
• Know your Teammates: The organizational cultures of fire departments, 
police departments, EMAs, and public health organizations are distinctly 
different. Public safety agencies should continue to learn more about each 
other by increasing contact at training sessions, drills, and exercises. 
Learning about the other agencies’ skills, needs, and limitations is of 
particular importance. 
• Conduct Realistic Exercises Frequently: Formal interagency cooperation 
goals reflected in plans, strategies, and agreements have supported 
interagency cooperation, but are best viewed as prerequisites to meaningful 
cooperation. Integrating the disciplines around periodic, multi-agency 
exercises has worked best to increase performance capabilities. Realistic 
exercises requiring the active investment and participation of multiple 
agencies have proven most valuable and the best investment of scarce 
resources. 
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• Clarify the Meaning of “Lead Agency” Status: Public safety agencies 
should work together to clarify the specific role and duties associated with 
“lead agency” status. Specifically, all agencies would benefit from having 
tangible expectations associated with this term. Health-related incidents 
would be a good starting place, because public health agencies are currently 
the least integrated in emergency response procedures. 
• Find an Appropriate Preparedness Balance: Local public safety officials 
should be wary of the terrorism-heavy focus and content of current federal 
guidance. Existing vulnerability analysis, that suggests naturally occurring 
incidents will occur more frequently than terrorist incidents, should be 
heeded. Wherever possible, training exercises that provide dual benefits 
(terrorism and all-hazards response) should be conducted. This can be 
accomplished by focusing on activities and practicing skills that can be used 
at both terrorism and all-hazards incidents. 
• Conduct Joint Preparedness Activities: The permanent collocation of public 
safety agencies was rejected as unnecessary because a “continual focus” on 
terrorism is unwarranted. However, EMAs have a strategic advantage 
because their pre-existing organizational connections with all departments, 
neighboring jurisdictions, and levels of government uniquely qualify them 
to impact all connected elements. EM is a suitable location to increase 
collaboration through collocation. Fire, police, and public health agencies 
should increase their commitment to the EM function. 
• Embrace NIMS/ICS: The Seattle area homeland security system has 
implemented and benefited from the NIMS/ICS. Their early commitment to 
its use and experience with it has increased teamwork and improved their 
response capability. Yet different disciplines reported varying degrees of 
success with it. Public safety agencies should promote NIMS/ICS use at 
drills, exercises, and real emergencies. Specifically, public safety agencies 
should practice using NIMS/ICS in its expanded format, where multiple 
agencies, jurisdictions, and levels of government will need to use it 
together.165 
• Adapt the National Planning Scenarios to Better Meet Local Needs: The 
NPS provide limited value to the Seattle urban area because they represent 
catastrophic incidents that were described as unlikely, unrealistic, and not 
reflective of local needs. However, they are beneficial in their consistency 
across jurisdictions, and therefore, provide an opportunity to share progress, 
challenges, and lessons learned with other jurisdictions. They are also 
supported federally. The Seattle area should engage the scenarios, choosing 
and engaging the most applicable ones first. 
• Include Others in Intelligence and Information-Sharing Operations: LE 
agencies should include the other disciplines in their intelligence and 
information sharing operations to the degree practicable. Because fire 
                                                 
165 Kane, Incident Command System, 5. 
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departments, public health agencies, and EMAs are virtually “brand new” to 
intelligence operations, their introduction and inclusion will have to follow 
a carefully measured pace. However, it is an activity worth undertaking. 
Intelligence fusion centers that have incorporated multiple disciplines exist 
as templates, and they welcome visitors. Law enforcement agencies should 
train their peer disciplines about all aspects of intelligence operations and 
include them in a meaningful way.166 Because the other disciplines are 
already connected in their communities, connected to LE agencies through 
existing systems, and also dependent on effective information sharing for 
incident outcomes, they have a vested interest. With proper training, they 
can provide valuable information to LE agencies. For LE agencies, 
including others in intelligence and information-sharing can be the vehicle 
that binds them closer to their peers. 
• Implement the Urban Area Strategy: Public safety agencies in the Seattle 
area are lacking integrated long term strategic plans. The Seattle area has 
benefited from the oversight, guidance, and funding provided by the federal 
government in the development of their urban area strategy, which has filled 
the void. Key public safety officials, from local governments, have 
supervised its growth and development. It is inclusive of all disciplines and 
contains measurable goals that reflect local and national priorities. Public 
safety agencies should continue to support the further development and 
implementation of the plan. 
                                                 
166  Shawn D. Smith, Inter-Agency Collaboration and Consequence Management: An All-Hazard 
Approach to Emergency Incident Response (Fairfax, Virginia: Public Entity Risk Institute, 2004), 3. 
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APPENDIX 
A. DELPHI PANEL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. Are there historical lessons to be learned from the relationships between 
disciplines in the Seattle area? If so, what are they? 
2. How did the 9/11 attacks impact the need for cooperation between homeland 
security disciplines in the Seattle area? 
3. How would specific warning information or intelligence regarding the possibility 
of an attack be shared among the key disciplines in the Seattle area? 
4. What role should local elected officials play during the management of a 
terrorism incident in our area? 
5. What are some of the unique policy issues specific to your discipline that will 
either help or hinder effective interagency cooperation in the future? 
6. List a short phrase that describes the primary homeland security role of each of 
the following: 
• Local fire department 
• Local municipal law enforcement 
• Emergency management 
• Public health 
7. What is the primary responsibility of each of the following with regard to 
homeland security in the Seattle area? 
• Local fire department 
• Local municipal law enforcement 
• Emergency management 
• Public health 
8. Regarding the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident 
Command System (ICS) language it contains, please comment on: 
• Your agency’s perception of their usefulness. 
• The extent to which they have been accepted by your discipline. 
• The extent to which they are relied on for everyday activities. 
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• The extent that they have been incorporated into the policies, procedures, and 
plans or your agency. 
9. Regarding the National Planning Scenarios, please comment on: 
• The degree to which you believe them to be realistic forecasts of potential 
actual events. 
• The degree to which they have been used them for planning and  
training purposes. 
• The degree to which you think they represent a useful planning tool. 
10. An “Incident of National Significance” is an actual or perceived high impact 
event. If one occurred in the Seattle area, how prepared do you think we are as a 
region to use the NIMS to manage the incident? What are the challenges? How 
would personnel accountability from various agencies be accomplished? 
11. With regard to terrorism and preparedness response, what barriers to collaboration 
and cooperation exist? 
12. Are any processes in place to further develop and refine existing collaborative 
efforts? If so, what are they? 
 Which discipline do you collaborate most successfully with? 
13. Are there homeland security goals that your organization cannot achieve alone, 
that can only be achieved by collaborating with other disciplines? If so, what 
are they? 
14. How is the commitment to interagency cooperation reflected in your discipline’s 
local plans and policies? 
15. How are interagency cooperation goals reflected in Seattle area long term 
strategic plans? 
16. What mechanisms are available for integrating disciplines on a “day to day” basis 
for training purposes? 
17. How do resource limitations affect your organization’s ability to collaborate with 
the other disciplines? 
18. To what degree does competition for scarce resources hinder collaboration? 
19. How might closer professional relationships between the disciplines help improve 
outcomes for terror victims? 
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20. How ready is your organization to enter into new interagency agreements and 
relationships? How would you prove or demonstrate that readiness? 
21. What would your agency be willing to pay in terms of tangible resources and loss 
of unilateral control to achieve a higher degree of preparedness? 
22. What are the strategic considerations for pre-staging of resources and capabilities 
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